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I. INTRODUCTION 
To date, commentary on the role of securities regulation has 
focused on its role vis-à-vis financial markets.  Academics have posited 
that the purpose of securities regulation is to make markets operate more 
efficiently.1  In general, the goals of securities regulation – when 
attempting to improve market efficiency – have been consistent with a 
social welfare approach to government regulation.2 
 
 1. See, e.g., Matthew Beville, Dino Falaschetti, & Michael J. Orlando, An 
Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 849, 
858 (2010) (“[A] wealth of economic theory and evidence supports the hypothesis that 
‘free markets’ work better when the law provides a low-transaction-cost 
environment.”); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of 
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities 
regulation is to attain efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of 
resources in the economy.”); Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management 
Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 522 (2009) (“The central idea behind the 
welfare-economics inquiry is that society fares best when markets are competitive.   
Regulation is therefore justified to the extent it corrects for failures in the market that 
hinder competition and does so in a cost-effective manner.”). 
 2. See Beville et. al., supra note 1, at 859-60 (treating securities regulation of 
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 Specific arguments along these lines have prioritized the role of 
securities regulation in correcting market failures.3  Perhaps the most 
common market failure discussed in the context of securities regulation 
is imperfect information.4  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
systemic risk as similar to the effect of pollution on third-parties, where regulation is 
used to improve social welfare).  Relying on a social welfare approach involves using 
regulation to correct a market failure, as when regulation is necessary to correct the 
financial incentives for industry participants to pollute at the expense of others, by 
internalizing the externalities they cause.  Id.  See also Schwartz, supra note 1, at 525 
(“A welfare-economics framework can provide a backbone to regulatory analysis in this 
area . . . .  Free competition . . . may not always yield such a utopian result. If the 
market itself is flawed, then it may be unwise to rely solely on the invisible hand to 
bring about societal progress. Regulation, therefore, may be justified when a market 
suffers from such structural imperfections—so-called market failures.  Markets could 
fail if they involve[] the provision of public goods or cause[] harmful third-party effects 
(so-called negative externalities).”). 
 3. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 525 (“If the market itself is flawed, then it may be 
unwise to rely solely on the invisible hand to bring about societal progress. Regulation, 
therefore, may be justified when a market suffers from such structural imperfections—
so-called market failures.”). 
 4. See id. at 521 (“In the fund industry, the primary market-failure concerns 
revolve around consumer fallibility—that fund investors potentially lack the 
information and know-how to properly make investing decisions without regulatory 
intervention.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 1, at 756 (summarizes the views 
of proponents of mandatory disclosure, describing information as a public good, where 
optimal levels will not be provided by private entities without some form of mandatory 
disclosure); David E. Riggs, Robert C. Rosselot, & Melanie Mayo West, Securities 
Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Banker’s Primer, 113 BANKING L.J. 864, 865 (1996) 
(describing regulation of mutual funds through disclosure as “a foundation of investor 
protection” and “intended to facilitate informed investment decisions and to provide 
basic uniformity among mutual funds”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: 
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH U. 
L.Q. 417, 418 (2003) (in order to be effective, mandatory disclosure, which is designed 
to solve informational asymmetries and “promote[]  informed investor decision making, 
capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency,” requires both the actual 
disclosure of information and that information being put to use effectively); Onnig H. 
Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Role in Regulating 
Information, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2007) (“The availability of and access to . . . 
information on reasonable terms has been identified as one of the essential 
characteristics of strong financial markets.”).  The existence of imperfect information 
arises in any case where there is not perfect information – where everyone is assumed to 
be informed about the entire history of actions that have already been taken.  Boğaçhan 
Çelen & Shachar Kariv, An Experimental Test of Observational Learning Under 
Imperfect Information, 26 ECON. THEORY 677, 678 (2005).  A simple example of 
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(“SEC” or “Commission”) has long seen its role as an agency that 
mitigates information problems by promoting the availability and 
accuracy of information.5 
In addition to imperfect information, some scholars have focused 
on the other market failures which impact securities markets.  For 
example, some have attempted to model and remedy the problem of 
systemic risk, a negative externality caused by the trades and investment 
positions of certain financial players in the market because of the 
interconnectedness of their own trades.6  Another justification for 
 
imperfect information would be to assume that in a competitive market, sellers know 
the quality of what they are selling, while buyers only know the average quality in the 
market as a whole.  Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Externalities in 
Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q. J. ECON. 229, 
239 (1986). 
 5. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “The Investor’s Advocate: 
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital 
Formation,” http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) 
(“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive from 
a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private 
individuals, should have access to basic facts about an investment prior to buying or 
selling it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful 
financial and other information to the public.”); Assessing The Madoff Ponzi Scheme 
and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the U.S. H.R. Comm. on Financial Services 
and Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises, 
111th Cong. 111-12 (2009) (Statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Division of 
Investment Management at U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts020409-joint.htm (“The SEC is concerned 
primarily with promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, 
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud.”). 
 6. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial 
System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 673 (2010) (“Systemic risk is the risk that the 
failure of one significant financial institution can cause or significantly contribute to the 
failure of other significant financial institutions as a result of their linkages to each 
other.”).  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008) 
(“The classic example of systemic risk . . . is a bank run [because] . . . [t]he chain of 
subsequent failures can occur because banks are closely intertwined financially. They 
lend to and borrow from each other, hold deposit balances with each other, and make 
payments through the interbank clearing system (whereby banks with equity and 
deposit accounts exceeding their liabilities can offer these excess funds to other banks 
who wish to increase loans to their customers).  Because of this interconnectedness, one 
bank’s default on an obligation to another may adversely affect that other bank’s ability 
to meet its obligations to yet other banks, and so on down the chain of banks and 
beyond.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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regulation that has been proposed is minimizing the principal-agent 
problem,7 which relates to market failures caused by imperfect 
information and transaction costs.  Boosting investor confidence has also 
been cited as a goal of securities regulation,8 although it is not clear 
which market failure this goal addresses. 
What is missing from an analysis of the role of securities regulation 
is a social welfare justification that is distinct from market efficacy 
altogether.  While improving the efficiency of markets can improve 
social welfare by facilitating investment decisions that increase investor 
utility, wealth and investor satisfaction could also be increased for a 
significant group of investors by considering policy measures that are 
not traditionally associated with enhancing market efficiency.  I evaluate 
the implications of securities regulatory policy, contending that one of 
its explicit goals is, and should be, the expansion of opportunities for 
wealth accumulation across different sectors of the population.  
Different sectors of the population include distinct groups of investors: 
those who are wealthy and those who are not; those who delegate their 
 
 7. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency 
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (“Disclosure can help reduce the cost 
of monitoring promoters’ and managers’ use of corporate assets for self-interested 
purposes. The modern literature on the firm recognizes the ubiquity and importance of 
such agency problems; moreover, rules mandating particular disclosures are common in 
principal-agent contexts.  It therefore seems reasonable to consider the reduction of 
agency costs as an efficiency justification for mandatory disclosure in securities 
markets.”); Paredes, supra note 4, at 462-67 (arguing that disclosure would reduce 
agency costs by limiting the need for investigation and enforcement actions as 
corporations would limit undesirable conduct if the public was aware of all their 
actions, and that investors need to be confident in the markets in order to invest, 
something that an appropriate level of regulation can help achieve). 
 8. Paredes, supra note 4 at 467-70 (arguing that an investor’s belief that she has 
adequate information on a company’s activities improves investor confidence in 
financial markets); Large Trader Reporting System, Exchange Act Release No. 61908, 
75 Fed. Reg. 21456, 21484 (Apr. 23, 2010) (proposing rules that would allow the SEC 
to collect information on large volumes of assets or asset value for the purpose of 
improving the SEC’s understanding of the impact of large traders on securities markets 
and being “better positioned to administer and enforce the federal securities laws, 
thereby promoting the integrity and efficiency of the markets, as well as, ultimately, 
investor confidence and capital formation”); Short-Term Borrowings Disclosure, 
Exchange Act Release Nos. 33–9143, 34–62932, 75 Fed. Reg. 59866, 59886 (Sept. 28, 
2010) (proposing rules that would require greater disclosure of registrants’ short-term 
borrowing for the purpose of maintaining “investor confidence in the full and fair 
disclosure required of all registrants”). 
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investment decisions and those who do not; those who are well informed 
about financial institutions and products and those who are not; and, in 
short, those who are financially sophisticated9 and those who are not. 
Expansion of opportunity may appear novel as a goal justifying 
financial regulation, but it should not.  In other areas of government 
policy, promoting opportunities for different groups has been recognized 
as a worthy justification for government intervention.  Indeed, 
promoting wealth through the ownership of housing for the middle and 
lower income classes has long been a mainstay of U.S. social policy.10  
Politicians have touted home ownership as emblematic of achieving the 
American dream11 and have encouraged middle class citizens to rely on 
 
 9. A financially sophisticated investor has been defined as “an investor that, either 
alone or with the assistance of a purchaser representative, possesses such knowledge 
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the 
merits and risks of the prospective investment.”  Houman B. Shadab, The Law and 
Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 240, 258 n. 114 (2009). 
 10. See Beville et. al., supra note 1, at 856 (“For example, the Federal Housing 
Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 required the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to establish goals encouraging [government 
sponsored enterprises] to promote home ownership among low-income borrowers and 
borrowers in historically underserved areas.”); U.S. Department of Labor, “Home 
Needs of Nation Offer Opportunity for Constructive Initiative,” Information and 
Education Service, Division of Public Works and Construction Development, March 
18, 1919 (No. 3-17A: National Archives, Washington, D.C.) (“The home-building 
problem of the country must be approached from a new angle. The central idea must be 
to build well, yet inexpensively, so that the opportunity of home-ownership may be 
widened and extended to persons to whom, heretofore, it has been closed. The problem 
can be solved by private interests. If they devote their energies to the situation they will 
meet the same success that was theirs in the automobile and in the piano industries.”) 
(cited in Thomas C. Hubka & Judith T. Kenny, Examining the American Dream: 
Housing Standards and the Emergence of a National Housing Culture, 1900-1930, 13 
PERSP. VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE 49, 49 (2006), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/20355368); Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: 
How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership 
Accessible to Whites and out of Reach for Black, 115 YALE L.J. 186, 188 (2005) (“Prior 
to the 1930s, owner-occupied housing was a good held primarily for reasons of 
consumption — not investment — and usually acquired late in life. Through New Deal 
reforms, homeownership became the primary mechanism that middle-class Americans 
use to build assets. Today, 60% of the total assets of middle-class Americans are held in 
owner-occupied homes.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 11. See Curt Hochbein, Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, 38 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 889, 889 (2010) (“Owning a home has transformed from being part of the 
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the value of their home as a source of wealth.12  The policy of promoting 
home ownership as a form of wealth accumulation has significantly 
impacted the tax code of the United States13 and has served as the 
impetus for the formation of Fannie Mae in 1938,14 the creation of 
Freddie Mac in 1970,15 and the institution of the FHA loan guarantee 
 
‘American Dream’ to what many people, including our legislators, see as the ‘American 
Right.’”); President George H.W. Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin 
(July 27, 1992) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=21270 
(“Part of the American dream is owning your own home”). 
 12. See Foreclosure, Predatory Mortgage and Payday Lending in America’s 
Cities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 6 
(2007) (statement of Josh Nassar, Vice President for Federal Affairs, Center for 
Responsible Lending (CRL)) (“Nearly 60 percent of the total wealth held by middle-
class families resides in their home equity - the value of their home minus the amount 
they owe on it. For African-American and Hispanic families, the share is much higher, 
topping 88 percent for both groups.”); Alice M. Thomas, The Racial Wealth Divide 
Through the Eyes of the Younger Family: Undoing America’s Legacy of Wealth 
Inequality in Search of the Elusive American Dream Utilizing a Sankofa Model of 
Transitional Justice, 5 FLA. A&M U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009) (“The residential home is 
typically the largest wealth-producing asset for the middle class”). 
 13. See John E. Anderson et al., Tax Reform and Incentives to Encourage Owner-
Occupied Housing: Analysis of the President’s Tax Reform Panel Recommendation to 
Convert the Mortgage Interest Deduction to a Tax Credit, at 2 (Sept. 19, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=943062 (“Public policy designed to encourage 
home ownership has operated primarily through the federal income tax system in the 
United States. With multiple incentives for home-ownership, the income tax system is 
the main tool by which the federal government encourages families to become home-
owners and accumulate wealth in the form of real estate.”); Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse 
M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & 
ECON. 37, 37-38 (2003) (“The American subsidy of homeownership is among the most 
prominent features of our tax code. In 1999, $773 billion was deducted by 40 million 
homeowners using the home mortgage interest deduction.”); Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist 
Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 550 
(Summer 2007) (“[The mortgage interest deduction] makes housing ownership more 
affordable because it enables prospective homebuyers to qualify for larger mortgages 
than their incomes would otherwise justify.”). 
 14. See Christopher L. Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Home 
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149, 154 (2009) (“Even with the 
prospect of a federal guarantee on mortgage loan terms, the housing crisis of the 1930’s 
continued. In 1938 Congress created Fannie Mae to simply buy up mortgages that met 
federal underwriting guidelines and public policy objectives.”) 
 15. See id. at 156 (“In 1970, Congress created ‘Freddie Mac’ to serve a similar role 
as Fannie Mae.  By creating a second Government Sponsored Enterprise, Congress 
hoped to help diversify and promote modest competition in the secondary market.”). 
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program.16  This support reached such an excess that government 
support for housing and our societal faith in that support, has been 
deemed one of the leading causes of the financial crisis of 2008.17 
While home ownership may be the area for which the connection to 
wealth accumulation has been the most clearly articulated, it is certainly 
not the only area in which expansion of opportunity to different groups 
has been accepted as a legitimate government objective.  Education 
policy is another area in which the principle that the government should 
promote the expansion of opportunity is salient.  The stated purpose of 
recent education policy has been to improve the educational outcomes of 
economically disadvantaged groups in order to facilitate their access to 
opportunities for economic and social mobility.18  Fundamentally, the 
goal of “No Child Left Behind” was “excellence and equity in education 
 
 16. See Geoffrey D. Korff, Reviving the Forgotten American Dream, 113 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 417, 436-37 (2008) ([T]he Federal Housing Administration . . . insures lenders 
against the risk of default on single-family homes.  The FHA gives middle income 
families the ability to purchase housing at affordable rates of interest by providing them 
access to credit that was not available to middle-income earners to such an extent prior 
to its creation.”). 
 17. The federal government continually encouraged widespread access to housing 
since the 1930s to avert economic crises or overcome increasing economic inequality.  
That encouragement came in the form of government institutions providing guarantees 
for low-income debt or pushing the government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) to 
increase its support of low-income borrowing.  As the federal government held more of 
the risk of low-income debt, the private sector was able to offer credit to more debtors 
with little income, assets, or savings.  When the low-income debtors defaulted, the 
private sector experienced a systemic shock.   See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: 
HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 32-45 (Princeton 
University Press 2010) (“[S]ubprime lending and the associated subprime mortgage-
backed securities were central to this crisis.  Without any intent of absolving the brokers 
and the banks who originated the bad loans or the borrowers who lied about their 
incomes, we should acknowledge the evidence suggesting that government actions, 
however well intended, contributed significantly to the crisis.”). 
 18. “Education has always been a fundamental part of achieving the American 
Dream. An educated citizen is more likely to hold a good job, escape poverty, own a 
home, start a business, be free from crime, and participate in America’s democracy.”  
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, THE WHITE HOUSE, EDUCATION: THE PROMISE OF 
AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2004), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/-2004/09/20040926.html. “Now, for years, we’ve recognized that 
education is a prerequisite for prosperity.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
President on Education Reform at the National Urban League Centennial Conference 
(July 29, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-education-reform-national-urban-league-centennial-conference. 
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for all students.”19  It sought to achieve this by punishing schools, 
through a variety of measures, for not meeting certain basic standards.20  
The goal was to ensure that even the most disadvantaged students 
attained basic grade level proficiency in math, reading, and science21 in 
order to participate as well-informed members of the electorate and to 
adapt to the changing demands of the information age.22  The Obama 
Administration has continued the pursuit of this goal with its “Race to 
the Top” program, in which states compete for a share of a $4 billion 
fund by implementing plans to improve teacher accountability, expand 
 
 19. David Nash, Improving No Child Left Behind: Achieving Excellence and Equity 
in Partnership with the States, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 239, 242 (2002).  The law required 
states to adopt standards, conduct assessments, and report “adequate yearly progress,” 
continually increasing the level of students who meet the standard of proficiency, 
meeting 100% by 2013-14.  Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act 
Needs to be Restructured to Accomplish its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. 
REV. 1, 8-9 (2007). 
 20. Schools that did not meet the appropriate standards would lose funding and be 
forced to undertake restructuring action necessary to enable them to meet standards.  
Ratner, supra note 19, at 9-11. Students of low-income families who are the most 
disadvantaged by underperforming schools will be given the first opportunity to transfer 
to better performing schools in the area.  Amy M. Reichbach, The Power Behind the 
Promise: Enforcing No Child Left Behind to Improve Education, 45 B.C. L. REV. 667, 
675-76 (2004).  As of 2008, schools in 32 states have been sanctioned for low 
performance. Jessica Flynn, No Child Left Behind Gets a Tip From Tort Theory: 
Protecting Responsible Schools Against Undeserved Sanctions, 31 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 157, 169 (2008).  See also Sam Dillon, Under ‘No Child’ Law, Even Solid Schools 
Falter, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/10/13/education/13child.html?pagewanted=1&ref=no_child_left_behind_act 
(“Schools that miss targets for two consecutive years are labeled ‘needing 
improvement’ and face escalating sanctions that can include staff changes or 
closings.”); Annie Correal, Leaving the No Child Left Behind List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2009, at L12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/22/nyregion/long-
island/22improveli.html?ref=no_child_left_behind_act (“At the Caroline G. Atkinson 
School, which serves ... fifth and sixth graders, and which was also taken off the 
[“Needs Improvement”] list this year, the school doubled the time devoted to math and 
English language arts, and added after-school and Saturday tutoring sessions, with the 
help of private grants . . . .  A school or district is removed from the list when it shows 
improvement two years in a row in student performance in an area where a problem was 
identified.”). 
 21. Matthew D. Knepper, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of the No Child 
Left Behind Act’s One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and its Consequences, 53 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 899, 899 (2009). 
 22. Ratner, supra note 19, at 4-5. 
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charter schools, and improve the lowest-achieving schools.23  The 
purpose of these measures is to expand educational opportunities to 
those who are not sufficiently wealthy or informed enough to access 
better quality schools.  The program seeks to improve the quality of all 
schools, but particularly those that service disadvantaged children, in 
order to expand their opportunities. 
Perhaps the expansion of educational opportunities to 
disadvantaged groups is perceived as inherently justified because 
guaranteeing certain educational opportunities has long been a legal and 
political American value.  More than twenty-eight years ago, the 
Supreme Court demonstrated its concern for equality of opportunity in 
education when it held that children of illegal immigrants could not be 
denied public schooling.24  The Court articulated the consequences of 
inequality by asserting that, “[c]hildren denied an education are placed 
at a permanent and insurmountable competitive disadvantage, for an 
uneducated child is denied even the opportunity to achieve.  And when 
those children are members of an identifiable group, that group—
through the State’s action—will have been converted into a discrete 
underclass.”25  Thus, preventing the perpetuation of a discrete underclass 
has been recognized as a legitimate social objective in the context of 
education.  While the promotion of wealth accumulation (apart from 
housing) has not been consistently recognized as a regulatory goal, the 
perpetuation of classes divided by wealth through the concentration of 
opportunities for wealth accumulation is not remarkably different from 
the consequences of the concentration of educational opportunities. 
Beyond economic disadvantages, the U.S. government has also 
sought to expand opportunities to racial groups who would not 
otherwise have them.  Civil rights advocates have agreed that 
“[g]overnment . . . was responsible for ensuring that each individual had 
 
 23. The “Race to the Top” program also focused on preparing “students to succeed 
in college and the workplace and to compete in the global economy.” See Race to the 
Top Fund Executive Summary, United States Department of Education (Nov. 2003), 
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.  Of the 
46 states that applied to the competition, 11 states and the District of Columbia received 
a share of the $4 billion.  See Press Release, United States Department of Education, 
Nine States and the District of Columbia Win Second Round Race to the Top Grants 
(Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/nine-states-and-district-
columbia-win-second-round-race-top-grants. 
 24. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 25. Id. at 234. 
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access to all spheres of public activity – social, economic, and political – 
regardless of race, sex, or ethnic origin.”26  Through civil rights 
legislation, the government sought to expand opportunities of all kinds – 
employment, education, access to public accommodations, and voting 
rights – to groups who might have otherwise been restricted from 
them.27  It did so to prevent the continued segregation of opportunity in 
our society. 
Thus, in multiple arenas apart from financial regulation – housing, 
education, and civil rights – the U.S. government took steps to expand 
the opportunities available to groups who might not have had those 
opportunities without some form of government intervention.  Housing 
policy sought to make it easier for more households to own homes, 
despite limitations on wealth and access to credit.  Education policy 
sought to provide students living in neighborhoods where their schools 
were disadvantaged with opportunities available to those situated more 
favorably with respect to their income and geography.  Civil rights 
legislation sought to promote opportunities for those denied them 
because of their race.  In each of these cases, multiple justifications for 
the chosen policies were present.  The expansion of opportunity as an 
end in itself was not the only potential justification for these policies, but 
it was perceived and utilized as a legitimate justification. 
In all of these arenas, social policy justifications were not limited to 
 
 26. Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action – Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1312, 1312 (1986). 
 27. President John F. Kennedy, Radio and Television Report to the American 
People on Civil Rights (June 11, 1963), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/ 
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/- 
003POF03CivilRights06111963.htm (“It ought to be possible for American consumers 
of any color to receive equal service in places of public accommodation, such as hotels 
and restaurants and theaters and retail stores, without being forced to resort to 
demonstrations in the street, and it ought to be possible for American citizens of any 
color to register to vote in a free election without interference or fear of reprisal . . . .  
[An African-American], regardless of the section of the Nation in which he is born, has 
about one-half as much chance of completing a high school as a white baby born in the 
same place on the same day, one-third as much chance of completing college, one-third 
as much chance of becoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becoming 
unemployed, about one-seventh as much chance of earning $10,000 a year, a life 
expectancy which is 7 years shorter, and the prospects of earning only half as much . . . 
.  I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not 
fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or 
law.”). 
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arguments regarding market efficiency and the need to mitigate market 
failures, even though these arguments were just as salient in these areas 
as in the case of financial regulation.  For instance, supporting housing 
has positive externalities for economic growth,28 psychological well-
being,29 and political participation.30  Market failures prevented more 
widespread distribution of these benefits.31  With respect to education 
 
 28. See Dimitri B. Papadimitriou et al., The Effects of a Declining Housing Market 
on the U.S. Economy 5-6 (Levy Economics Institute Working Paper No. 506, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999957 (“There are several ways in which housing 
is an integral part of a growing economy, especially in periods of rapidly rising home 
values.  First, homebuilding, furniture sales, and home improvements account for a 
large percentage of GDP.  Government statistics show that the residential investment 
sector is already acting as a drag on economic growth. Second, rising home prices 
increase household net worth, and consumers probably base their spending decisions 
partly on their net worth, not just their income.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 29. Christopher E. Herbert & Eric S. Belsky, The Homeownership Experience of 
Low-Income and Minority Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, 10 
CITYSCAPE 5, 9 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341163 (“Another 
significant benefit thought to be associated with homeownership is higher life 
satisfaction and better psychological health. Owners are thought to have higher self-
esteem, due to both the higher social status associated with homeownership and the 
sense of accomplishment that results from having achieved a significant life goal.”). 
 30. Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are 
Homeowners Better Citizens? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
6363, 1998), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/54.Glaeser. 
Home_.pdf (arguing that homeownership is connected to specific externalities that are 
proxies for social connection and political participation.  “Homeowners are 
approximately 10 percent more likely to know their U.S. representative by name. They 
are 9 percent more likely know the identity of their school board head. Homeowners are 
15 percent more likely to vote in local elections and 6 percent more likely to work to 
solve local problems. On average, they are members of .25 more non-professional 
organizations than non-owners.  Homeowners are 12 percent more likely to garden and 
10 percent more likely to own guns. Homeowners attend church more frequently than 
renters.”) (internal citations omitted) (cited in Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, 
The Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37 
(2003)). 
 31. The lack of more widespread housing ownership prior to the emergence of 
subprime lending was the result of inadequately functioning credit markets because of 
information barriers.  Subprime lending led to an increase in homeownership as credit 
was made available to groups previously excluded from credit markets.  See Todd J. 
Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law & Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1, 4 (Winter 2009) (citing James R. Barth et al., Despite Foreclosures, 
Subprime Lending Increases Homeownership, SUBPRIME MORTGAGE DATA SERIES 
(Milken Inst.) (Dec. 2007)).  The previously excluded groups were able to access credit 
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policy, positive externalities result from a more educated population.32  
As for civil rights, in addition to the compelling democratic arguments 
for promoting them,33 information problems also perpetuate 
discrimination.34  Along with these alternative justifications, expanding 
 
markets because of the increased use of objective credit scores that gave lenders better 
information on which potential borrowers were credit worthy.  See id. at 7 (“Subprime 
lending emerged as a result of interest rate deregulation and improved underwriting 
procedures that reduced some of those information asymmetries, including increased 
use of credit scoring as an indicator of willingness and ability to repay a loan. The use 
of credit scores as objective tests of borrower risk allowed lenders to create a schedule 
of interest rates and other loan terms that currently make up the mortgage market, 
leaving traditional one-size-fits-all lending products as relics of the past.”) (citing 
Kristopher Gerardi, Harvey S. Rosen & Paul Willen, Do Households Benefit from 
Financial Deregulation and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market 8 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Boston, Pub. Pol’y Discussion Papers No. 06-6, 2006)). 
 32. James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz, & Austin Nichols, The Attack on Nonprofit 
Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1204 (2010) (“A common 
example of a good with a positive externality is education. Better-educated people make 
better citizens, improve the quality of democratic decision making, are less likely to 
lead lives of crime, and otherwise contribute positively to the lives of others.”); Rachel 
Denae Thrasher & Kevin P. Gallagher, 21st Century Trade Agreements: Implications 
for Development Sovereignty, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 313, 318 (2010) (“Basic 
literacy and education have positive externalities such as improved health and better 
participation in democratic processes . . . .”). 
 33. See, e.g., Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream: Address at March on 
Washington (Aug. 28, 1963) (“In a sense we have come to our nation’s capital to cash a 
check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the 
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note 
to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, 
black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).   See also ERIKA WOOD, RESTORING THE RIGHT 
TO VOTE 1 (Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law 2009), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/5c8532e8134b233182_z5m6ibv1n.pdf  (“The right to vote 
forms the core of American democracy. Our history is marked by successful struggles 
to expand the franchise, to include those previously barred from the electorate because 
of race, class, or gender. As a result our democracy is richer, more diverse, and more 
representative of the people than ever before.”); Christopher Leon Jones, Jr., The 
Protection of Democracy: The Symbolic Nature of Federal Hate Crime Legislation, 29 
T. MARSHALL L. REV. 17, 35 (2003) (“One’s exercise of political liberty is dependent on 
the protection of one’s personal liberty; therefore, the existence of civil rights is a key 
virtue of democracy. Accordingly, the recognition and protection of civil rights is also 
necessary for the proper functioning of democracy.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 34. Paulo R. A. Loureiro & Adolfo Sachsida, Adverse Selection, Asymmetric 
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opportunity was, and still is, an acknowledged and legitimate 
justification for these policies.35 
Like these social policies, securities regulation can and should be 
justified on a number of grounds, but historically, expanding 
opportunities for wealth accumulation across sectors of the population 
has not been a justification that has been given credence.  This paper 
advocates for, and examines the implications of, implementing an 
opportunities-based perspective in evaluating securities regulation for 
policy decisions.  I demonstrate how the policy implications of such a 
perspective are often distinct from those implicated by other approaches, 
such as a public welfare approach to securities regulation.  In this 
Article, I apply this perspective and what we know from the empirical 
research about investor behavior36 to examine how securities policy 
could be shaped by an opportunities-based perspective in four areas: (1) 
enhancing access to information and financial institutions;37 (2) 
requiring disclosures;38 (3) impacting the behavioral biases of 
 
Information and Discrimination in the Labor Market, 30 PLANEJAMENTO E POLÍTICAS 
PÚBLICAS [PPP] 71, 76 (2007) (Braz.) (“[A]symmetric information is a strong 
determinant of discrimination, which the main outcome being that workers with 
different productivities earn the same wage.”); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical 
Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972) (noting that an 
employer will discriminate against a group of workers if the cost of obtaining 
information about the individuals is excessive). 
 35. See Beville, Falaschetti, & Orlando, supra note 1 (on housing); Nash, supra 
note 19 (on education); Abram, supra note 26 (on Civil Rights legislation). 
 36. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the 
SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003); James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund 
Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907 (2005); Paredes, 
supra note 4; Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation?  Some Behavioral 
Observations Regarding Proposals for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397 (2002); Olivier 
Armantier, Do Wealth Differences Affect Fairness Considerations? (CIRANO, 
Working Paper No. 2006s-13, 2006); Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Joaquim Silvestre, 
Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison (Pompeu Fabra Univ. 
Dep’t of Econ. and Bus., Working Paper No. 692, 2003); Robert Bloomfield, Robert 
Libby, & Mark W. Nelson, Confidence and the Welfare of Less-Informed Investors 
(Jan. 30, 1998) (working paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=72068); Barbara 
Döbeli & Paolo Vanini, Stated and Revealed Investment Decisions Concerning 
Structured Products (Apr. 4, 2008) (Jan. 30, 1998) (working paper, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=991868). 
 37. See infra Part II. 
 38. See infra Part III. 
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investors;39 and (4) aligning the incentives of investment professionals to 
better facilitate the wealth accumulation of their clients.40  The 
implications of applying an opportunities-based approach to financial 
regulation are distinct from those of a public welfare or efficiency 
approach to regulation.  More so than these other approaches, an 
opportunities-based approach requires an understanding of the empirical 
realities of investor behavior and yields policy recommendations 
targeted at increasing opportunities for wealth accumulation for the 
average investor. 
 
II. DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS  
TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRODUCTS 
Access to financial markets, like access to education, employment, 
public accommodations, and a host of other areas, is significant in 
promoting opportunity.41  In the case of financial markets, the 
opportunity at stake is the opportunity to create and accumulate wealth.  
The adage, “it takes money to make money,”42 or, in other words, the 
assumption that wealth is required to create more wealth, embodies the 
idea that wealth results from the taking of large risks and that the 
wealthy are more likely and better able to bear such risks.43  While these 
 
 39. See infra Part IV. 
 40. See infra Part V. 
 41. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 127 (2004) 
(“[I]mproved access to bank accounts can reduce the costs of financial services for the 
poor, expand access to lower-cost forms of credit and increase opportunities for saving-
-all key to reducing poverty and expanding social mobility.”). 
 42. See Christopher H. Lytton, Soft Money: The Weapon of Choice for the 
Runaway Productions, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 719, 736 (2004) (“The old adage is true: 
it takes money to make money.”); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation, 12 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 197, 258 (2004) (“[I]t takes money to make money, and that is why the 
rich get richer and the poor get poorer.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Robert 
Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic By Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and 
Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership 
Society”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 90 (2005) (providing one manifestation of the old 
adage, that a lender will mitigate risk by taking a security interest in an asset already 
owned by the borrower, or by requiring a guaranty from a well-resourced associate of 
the borrower). 
 43. See Sarah Molseed, An Ownership Society For All: Community Development 
Financial Institutions as the Bridge Between Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building 
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assumptions do have some truth to them, a societal problem arises when 
government action perpetuates the superior opportunities of the wealthy 
to become wealthier.  Inequity in the opportunity to grow wealth should 
not be facilitated by the government any more than inequities in 
opportunities for education, employment, accommodations, and the like. 
Because of both the actual and expressive effects of government 
action on the relationships between different groups in society, the 
government does and should consider how its actions impact the 
perception and actuality of equity in the realm of securities regulation.  
In its current role of re-examining a host of market structure issues,44 the 
SEC is in a position to consider the impact on opportunities in its 
rulemaking.  By not taking into account differentiation in access, the 
government perpetuates the ability of certain groups to obtain 
advantages in the accumulation of wealth not available to other groups, 
thereby exacerbating disparities in opportunity. 
Creating disparities in the ability to grow wealth could create self-
perpetuating cycles of entitlement.  Research in psychology and 
economics has demonstrated that a danger of creating distinctions 
between the wealthy and non-wealthy is that such distinctions can create 
cycles of entitlement for the affluent and an acceptance of less equitable 
outcomes by the poor.45  Experiments have demonstrated that once 
individuals are endowed with relative wealth, they become accustomed 
 
Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 489, 492 (2006) (noting that a household’s 
stock of assets impacts its access to credit and “the ability to collateralize, thus opening 
the door to more credit and subsequent opportunities”); Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1532-35 (1996) (describing how wealth impacts the ability to 
bear risk, particularly in the context of pursuing a potentially lucrative legal claim); 
Robert Frank, How the Rich Invest, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2007, available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2007/06/12/how-the-rich-invest/ (“The rich invest 
differently because, well, they’re different.  They can take more risks because they have 
more money to lose.  And they can invest for the long-term . . . because they have so 
much extra capital . . . .  The rich prefer to invest directly in start-up companies . . . .  
The reasons for these differences are mainly access and suitability.  Investing in start-
ups is not as feasible for everyday investors because they don’t have all the information 
on hot new start-ups that the rich often get, known as “deal flow”.  And even if they did, 
everyday investors wouldn’t be able to risk the necessary capital.”). 
 44. For a detailed examination of several areas of market structure examination, see 
Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Strengthening 
Our Equity Market Structure, (Sep. 7, 2010), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch090710mls.htm. 
 45. See Armantier, supra note 36, at 419-20. 
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to wealth differences over time.46  This phenomenon was illustrated in 
an experiment with variations of the classic ultimatum game, in which 
participants were classified as rich proposers and poor proposers.47  In 
one treatment group, the proposers were rich while the receivers were 
poor, while in another treatment group, the proposers were poor and the 
receivers were rich.48  The experimenters found that even though 
participants initially strived for egalitarian distributions, over multiple 
repetitions of the game the rich proposers became less generous and the 
poor accepted lower offers.49  Similarly, the poor proposers became 
more generous over time while rich receivers became more 
demanding.50  As a result, the treatment groups, which began with a 
relatively small degree of inequity relative to the control group, ended 
up with a drastically different distribution than the control group.  The 
party endowed with more wealth had significantly increased its wealth 
relative to the other party by the end of a 60-stage game.51 
While the implications of this experiment should be extrapolated 
with caution, these results support the theory that those who are 
endowed feel more entitled to a larger share of societal wealth while the 
poor become accustomed to receiving a smaller proportion over time.  
Similarly, studies of inequity in pay between CEOs and employees have 
shown that greater inequity in pay gives CEOs a greater feeling of power 
and that they are more apt to maltreat employees.52  While wealth and 
income are distinct, it is not implausible that exacerbating already 
significant wealth differentials could have significant consequences for 
the ability of different groups of society to empathize with each other. 
These findings have policy implications.  If the law facilitates 
opportunities for wealth accumulation primarily for the affluent or a 
select few, then these chosen groups will come to expect such 
 
 46. See, e.g., id. 
 47. Id. at 408-13, 425. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 412. 
 50. Id. at 425. 
 51. Id. at 411-12, 425. 
 52. See, e.g., Sreedhari Desai, Arthur Brief & Jennifer George, When Executives 
Rake in Millions: Meanness in Organizations 25-26 (June 24, 2010) (working paper, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612486) (finding in an experiment that 
individuals designated as managers and varying levels of inequity in pay displayed an 
increased tendency to “fire” individuals designated as employees even when those 
“employees” turned in an adequate performance of the designated tasks). 
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opportunities and demand more of them, while the non-wealthy will 
become accustomed to inequitable distributions and being restricted in 
the opportunity to grow their wealth.  Several examples of areas in 
which differential access in the securities markets is present and 
facilitated by government regulation merit reform in light of an 
opportunities-based perspective. 
If we accept the premise of the opportunities-based perspective – 
differences in opportunity created by the government, whether perceived 
or actual, matter for societal well-being – then we should be particularly 
skeptical of blatant separations between classes facilitated by 
government regulation.  An example of an area of blatant separation 
created by financial regulation is the restriction on which investors can 
invest in hedge funds based on their ability to meet the net worth 
requirements articulated in the accredited investor standard.53  
Historically, the SEC has permitted certain financial institutions, such as 
hedge funds, to escape regulation.54  In order to protect unsophisticated, 
individual investors from the market imperfections of the unregulated 
world of hedge funds, the SEC restricts who can invest in a hedge 
fund.55  The SEC introduced the accredited investor requirement for 
investing in hedge funds in 1982.56  The SEC believed that hedge funds 
engage in risky investment strategies and that the best way to shield 
unsophisticated individual investors from such risk was to keep them 
from investing in the funds directly.57  Thus, in order to combat the 
potential market failure of information problems in the hedge fund 
 
 53. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 54. See, e.g., Matthew F. Gately, Much Ado About Nothing: An Analysis of the 
“Accredited Natural Person” Standard, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 760, 761; David 
Schneider, If At First You Don’t Succeed: Why the SEC Should Try and Try Again to 
Regulate Hedge Fund Advisers, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 261, 263 (2009); Scott V. Wagner, 
Hedge Funds: The Final Frontier of Securities Regulation and a Last Hope For 
Economic Revival, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2009). 
 55. Gately, supra note 54, at 776; Schneider, supra note 54, at 289. 
 56. Wagner, supra note 54, at 9-10.  See SEC General Rules and Regulations, 
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010) (defining accredited investor); 
See also Gately, supra note 54, at 762; Schneider, supra note 54, at 272-73 (discussing 
the requirements needed to satisfy the exemption under Regulation D). 
 57. Gately, supra note 54, at 776; Schneider, supra note 54, at 289; U.S. 
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE 
FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
80-81 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf 
[hereinafter 2003 Report]. 
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market – the problem that most investors would not understand and be 
able to evaluate the risks of investing in hedge funds – the SEC 
responded by preventing most investors from accessing hedge funds. 
Originally, the requirements for accreditation as a hedge fund 
investor were an individual annual income of at least $200,000 and a net 
worth of at least $1 million.58  In 2006, the SEC proposed rules requiring 
that an accredited investor own investments of at least $2.5 million, in 
addition to the income and net worth requirements, in order to invest in 
hedge funds.59  The SEC’s theory behind this accredited natural person 
standard was that, in addition to increasing the net worth requirement, 
ownership of investments at this level would provide a “clear standard to 
use in ascertaining whether a purchaser of a private investment vehicle’s 
securities is likely to have sufficient knowledge and experience in 
financial and business matters to enable that purchaser to evaluate the 
merits and risks of a prospective investment, or to hire someone who 
can.”60  Before these rules were adopted, Congress included a provision 
 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2010).  See also Gately, supra note 54, at 762; 
Schneider, supra note 54, at 272-73; Wagner, supra note 54, at 10. 
 59. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Placement Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 
8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (Jan. 4, 2007) (proposed Dec. 27, 2006) (consideration 
deferred pending comments review) [hereinafter 2006 Proposed Rule].  See also Gately, 
supra note 54, at 768-69.  Under the proposed rules, investments are to be defined as in 
rule 2a51-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, excluding the provisions that 
do not apply to natural persons.  2006 Proposed Rule, at 407.  See also 17 C.F.R. § 
270.2a51-1 (2010) (defining investments).  In 2007, the SEC recommended modifying 
the accredited investor standard to include an “investments-owned” standard.  
Accordingly, an individual would enjoy accredited investor status by owning at least 
$750,000 worth of investments.  The newly developed “investments-owned” standard 
could be substituted for the current net worth and income requirements.  Revisions of 
Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-8828, 72 
Fed. Reg. 45116, 45123-24 (Aug. 10, 2007) (proposed Aug. 3, 2007) (consideration 
deferred pending comments review) [hereinafter 2007 Proposed Rule].  In addition, the 
income and net worth requirements would be adjusted for inflation beginning in 2012 
and then every five years thereafter.  Id. at 45126.  These proposals also included the 
creation of a new classification, the large accredited investor, which would be met if an 
individual owned $2.5 million in investments or had an annual income of $400,000.  Id. 
at 45118.  The SEC estimates that 1.64% of households would qualify under the large 
accredited investor standard.  Id. at 45119. 
 60. 2006 Proposed Rule, supra note 59, at 405.  The SEC justified proposing the 
more stringent requirements because compiled data revealed that a much greater 
percentage of individuals qualified as accredited investors in 2003 than in 1982.  Id. at 
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limiting the eligibility requirements of accredited investors in the 
recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).61  Congress directed the SEC to exclude 
the value of an individual’s primary residence when computing the 
individual’s net worth as applicable to the current accredited investor 
standard; fewer individuals, as a result, can satisfactorily meet the 
conditions necessary for becoming accredited investors.62  In 2011, the 
SEC proposed rules that would add this provision to the accredited 
investor standard.63 
The rationale for denial of access to hedge funds appears to be the 
desire to isolate the realm in which complex financial institutions, which 
are difficult to regulate, can cause harm.64  The accredited investor 
standard, however, does not serve to shelter the non-accredited investor 
from the risks of hedge funds.65  Far more individuals are indirectly 
 
406; 2003 Report, supra note 57.  In 1982, for example, 1.87% of U.S. households 
qualified for accredited investor status as compared to approximately 8.47% in 2003, 
representing a 350% increase.  2006 Proposed Rule, supra note 59, at 406.  By 
incorporating the accredited natural person standard under the proposed revisions, the 
SEC estimates that only 1.3% of U.S. households would qualify for accredited investor 
status, which is lower even than the 1982 level.  Id. 
 61. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 413, 124 Stat. 1376, 1577-78 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
 62. Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577.  The SEC is directed to review the accredited 
investor standard four years after the Act’s enactment (and every four years thereafter) 
and make adjustments as deemed necessary “for the protection of investors, in the 
public interest, and in light of the economy.”  Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577-78. 
 63. Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 33-
9177, 76 Fed. Reg. 5307 (Jan. 31, 2011) (proposed Jan. 25, 2011). 
 64. See Wagner, supra note 54, at 18 (“Thus, the SEC reasons, hedge funds should 
only be available to sophisticated investors who have a high net wealth thereby 
minimizing the risk of severe loss to average investors.”). 
 65. “Accredited investors who can no longer directly invest in hedge funds because 
they do not meet the new accredited natural person standard will still be able to meet 
the lower financial requirements of funds of funds. While it is true that investing in a 
fund of funds provides additional investor protections, the shift from direct investment 
to indirect investment will not reduce the total amount of capital entering the hedge 
fund industry or the number of investors impacted by the industry.” (internal citations 
and quotation marks omitted). Gately, supra note 54, at 773 (arguing that non-
accredited persons may still be exposed to the risks of hedge funds through financial 
instruments called “funds of funds,” or retail funds that invest in various hedge funds, 
thus mitigating or eliminating the protections offered by the “Accredited Natural Person 
Standard”). 
2011] ANOTHER ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATION: 803 
EXPANDING INVESTOR OPPORTUNITY 
 
exposed to the risks associated with hedge funds66 by investing in funds 
of hedge funds (“FOHFs”)67 and could also be exposed to hedge funds 
through their pension funds.68  Moreover, hedge funds impose systemic 
risk on the rest of the financial market because of their increasing 
number and size, the concentration of the largest funds in the hands of a 
few advisers, and their use of leverage as a major investment strategy.69  
Thus, non-accredited investors are exposed to the risks of hedge funds 
through indirect investment as well as through the systemic risk imposed 
by hedge funds on the financial system. 
Although limiting access has not entirely shielded non-accredited 
investors from hedge funds70 and we do not know that hedge funds are 
any more risky on average than other investment vehicles,71 
 
 66. See, e.g., 2003 Report, supra note 57, at 82 (“[R]etail investors seeking 
diversification by investing in a Dual Registered FOHF . . . may take on more risk than 
desired as a part of their overall portfolio.”); Id. (“Although [pension plans, universities, 
endowments, foundations and other charitable organizations] typically qualify as 
“accredited investors” or “qualified purchasers,” these institutions, by investing in 
hedge funds, expose their participants or other beneficiaries to hedge funds.”). 
 67. Id. at 68-69.  Only a Dual-Registered FOHF (registered under both the 
Investment Company Act and the Securities Act) may publicly offer its securities.  
Currently, all registered FOHF’s have restricted their sales to individuals who meet the 
accredited investor standard, at a minimum.  This requirement, however, is not 
established by law, and can be changed by an FOHF at any time. 
 68. Id. at 82 (“Pension plans were among the earliest hedge fund investors. The 
pace of these investments, however, has increased over the past few years.”).  See also 
Wagner, supra note 54, at 24. (“Investors of the banks or beneficiaries of pension funds 
thus often indirectly, and often inadvertently, expose themselves to hedge fund risk.”).  
Alarmingly, pension funds, as of January 2005, accounted for 7% of hedge fund capital 
sources.  Id. 
 69. Schneider, supra note 54, at 287. 
 70. 2003 Report, supra notes 57 and accompanying text. 
 71. Shadab, supra note 9, at 240. (“In 2008, as losses from the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market transformed into an international financial crisis, the value of global 
equities dropped 42 percent while hedge funds worldwide lost a comparatively smaller 
19 percent for their investors.”); Id. at 271 (“The foregoing innovative hedge fund 
investment strategies have the general effect of reducing an investor’s exposure to 
market risk.”); Id. at 272 (“[H]edge funds have a relatively low correlation to standard 
systematic factors compared to mutual funds.”); Id. at  292 (“[D]espite the 
unprecedented 19 percent annual loss, hedge fund performance in 2008 was at an all 
time high relative to the U.S. public equity market, which lost 38.47 percent of its 
value.  Hedge funds also far outperformed stock mutual funds, which lost an average of 
37.6 percent in 2008.”) (footnote omitted). See also Kelly Bit, Hedge Funds Took in 
$16 Billion in October, Most in a Year, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 7, 2010, available at 
804 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
differentiating access has continued to be the preferred means of 
regulation.  Policy alternatives, however, do exist.  In order to limit the 
impact of hedge funds on the rest of the financial system, regulators 
could impose limits on the risk exuded by hedge funds by restricting 
credit to hedge funds, imposing leverage ratio limits, or correlating 
leverage limits with the riskiness of hedge fund assets.72  If evaluated 
from a public welfare perspective, limiting the credit and thereby the 
risk taken on by hedge funds has clear trade-offs.  On the one hand, 
limiting risk addresses the externality of the potential systemic risk 
imposed on the whole market by the risky transactions of one hedge 
fund that could impact thousands of counterparties.73  On the other hand, 
if the market is willing to provide credit and allow the hedge fund to be 
as leveraged as it is, regulations create distortions that prevent the 
market from working as it otherwise would.  Regulations might limit the 
upside potential of hedge funds, decreasing wealth and potentially 
decreasing investment by the wealthy.74 
If an opportunities-based perspective is considered along with the 
traditional social welfare approach, then the possible disincentives for 
investing by the wealthy are weighed against the loss in opportunities 
for others to invest.  Once the incorporation of an opportunities-based 
perspective occurs, differentiating access is no longer a preferred means 
of regulation.  If the policy problem that regulation is attempting to 
address is that hedge funds hold portfolios that are too risky to serve as 
the sole means of investment for an individual’s retirement, then 
regulation could limit the percentage of an investor’s savings that are 
invested in a hedge fund.  Such a regulation could both protect the 
wealth of unsophisticated investors as well as convey the expressive 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-08/hedge-funds-took-in-16-billion-in-
october-most-in-a-year.html (“Preliminary data show that hedge funds are 
outperforming the S&P 500 by about 21 basis points through November [2010].”). 
 72. Schneider, supra note 54, at 307-08. 
 73. Id. at 307 (noting that with leverage limits, hedge funds will be less likely to 
fail, and should they fail, “creditors will feel less pain which will stem the possible 
ripple effect”). 
 74. Id. (“One downside of [imposing leverage limits] is that, although losses are 
less magnified, profits will also not be as magnified.  Hedge funds may no longer be 
able to provide the above market returns that they have shown over the years and they 
will become less popular investment vehicles. Any decrease in the utilization of hedge 
funds may also correspondingly diminish the benefits that they provide to the market 
and investors.”). 
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message that the purpose of regulation is to further diversify and 
mitigate risk – not to separate society into those sufficiently wealthy to 
escape regulation and those who are not.75  Moreover, those who could 
benefit from the wealth-enhancing opportunities of hedge funds, but are 
not currently eligible, could benefit from access to these financial 
institutions, thereby increasing social welfare. 
Another area of differentiation is access to information.  The 
flourishing of flash orders and dark pools, to which only limited parties 
have access, is not so different from the world of hedge funds.  Flash 
orders permit some investors to see the prices of certain securities 
milliseconds before other investors.76  Flash orders create differential 
access to information between the general public who receives its 
information from the consolidated quotation data and those select 
market participants, generally those with access to special technology, 
who receive a market’s individual data feed.77  Commentators have 
argued that such orders provide an unfair advantage to insiders, allowing 
these individuals to trade ahead of the public.78  Yet, it is not clear that 
 
 75. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the 
Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 693 
(2010) (“[F]raming has been recognized as a critical tool for politicians and parties 
alike, in the effort to control the agenda and the hearts and minds of Americans.”); Cass 
R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2026 (1996). 
(“[A]n appropriately framed law may influence social norms and push them in the right 
direction. For example, if the law mandates recycling, perhaps it will affect social 
norms about the environment in a way that is different from (and better than) the way 
curbside charges might affect norms.”). 
 76. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the 
Spotlight on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Regulatory Proposal 
Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1041 (2010). 
 77. Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, 
Exchange Act Release No. 60684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48632, 48636 (Sep. 23, 2009) 
(proposed Sept. 18, 2009) (period for public comment reopened July 2, 2010) (hereafter 
2009 Flash Order Exception). 
 78. See, e.g., Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency 
Trading: Use and Controversy, DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, 36 (2010) (“[Senator 
Charles] Schumer argued that flash orders allow market insiders to utilize rapid trading 
platforms to trade ahead of those orders and profit from advanced knowledge of buying 
and selling activity.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Traders who benefit from 
the use of flash orders are shown the buy and sell orders ahead of everyone else in the 
marketplace in exchange for a fee. With this very small advance notice of market 
conditions, high frequency traders can use their super-computers to conduct rapid 
statistical analysis of the changing market state and trade ahead of the public market.”  
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these insiders are not retail-side investors who may use the advantages 
of flash orders to lower transaction costs, allowing them to benefit a 
large segment of the public through passed on benefits such as reduced 
commissions.79  Empirically, therefore, we do not know whether the 
presence of flash orders expands or restricts opportunities for wealth 
accumulation across sectors of the population. 
The SEC proposed a rule calling for the ban of flash orders in 
2009.80  Regulation has been justified, in part, by arguments that are 
consistent with an opportunities-based perspective and should be more 
explicitly tied to such a perspective.  If an opportunities-based 
perspective were to be employed, the effects of flash orders on different 
segments of the population should be taken into account when 
considering adoption of the flash order proposal.  Relevant justifications 
under an opportunities-based perspective have included that the use of 
flash orders could detract from the fairness and efficiency of the 
markets, that they may create a two-tiered market where the public does 
not have access to the most accurate pricing information, that they may 
create a disincentive for the public display of trading interest and harm 
quote competition among markets, and that they may decrease investor 
confidence by putting the common investor at a disadvantage to those 
with greater resources.81 
Similar considerations are relevant when evaluating the regulation 
of dark pools.  Dark pools, which are mediums where parties can trade 
without being regulated as they would be on an exchange,82 have 
 
Id. at 28.  “The SEC is mainly concerned with the possible creation of a two-tiered 
market system, which favors those with sophisticated computer systems over retail 
investors.”  Id. at 37.  “[O]nly those who have invested in sophisticated trading systems 
are able to effectively access flash orders.”  2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, 
at 48634. 
 79. 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48638; David D. Gruberg, 
Decent Exposure: The SEC’s Lack of Authority and Restraint in Proposing to Eliminate 
Flash Trading, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 263, 286 (2010). 
 80. The exception for flash orders in the national securities laws was first approved 
in 1978.  Flash orders as commonly referred to today, however, developed with 
improved technology as trading become more automated and electronic.  2009 Flash 
Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48632. 
 81. 2009 Flash Order Exception, supra note 77, at 48635-36, 48638. 
 82. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 60997, 
74 Fed. Reg. 61208, 61208 (Nov. 23, 2009) (proposed Nov. 13, 2009) (hereafter 2009 
Proposed Rule).  Dark pools have been created to operate under Regulation ATS, which 
allows trading to occur in venues not subject to the strict regulatory requirements of 
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increased in number from 10 in 2002 to 29 in 200983 and have grown to 
account for over 10% of all trading volume in 2010.84  Dark pools 
provide those investors who have access to them with a high-level of 
pre-trade privacy, allowing them select access to information on prices 
and sizes of transactions, and often provide a better price than is 
available on publicly traded exchanges.85  Currently, the existence of 
dark pools creates differential access to information between those select 
individuals and institutions that are granted access to a dark pool and the 
rest of the general investing public.86  Dark pools do not have to comply 
with fair access requirements until they exceed a volume threshold.87  
While the Fair Access Rule generally prohibits alternative trading 
systems from unreasonably prohibiting or limiting access to the trading 
system88 and requires alternative trading systems to keep and report 
records of whom they grant and deny access,89 dark pools can avoid the 
fair access requirements if the trading volume of a particular security in 
the dark pool is less than 5% of the security’s average daily volume 
traded in four of the preceding six months.90 
Commentators have argued that hiding information from the public 
through dark pools could harm the validity of price quotes and keep 
 
section 6 of the Exchange Act.  Hatch, supra note 76, at 1036-37. 
 83. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61208-09. 
 84. Nina Mehta, SEC Should Force Dark Pools to Improve Market Prices, NYSE 
Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-04-23/sec-should-force-dark-pools-to-improve-market-prices-nyse-
says.html (“Dark pools . . . handled 10 percent of U.S. equity trading in February 
[2010], compared with 5.8 percent in March 2008.”). 
 85. Hatch, supra note 76, at 1037-38.  See also 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, 
at 61211. 
 86. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61211 (“The public . . . does not have 
access to this valuable information concerning the best prices and sizes for NMS stocks. 
Rather, dark pools transmit this information only to selected market participants. In this 
regard, actionable IOIs can create a two-tiered level of access to information about the 
best prices and sizes for NMS stocks that undermines the Exchange Act objectives for a 
national market system.”). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5) (2011). 
 88. “Establish written standards for granting access to trading on its system.” 17 
C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(A) (2011); “Not unreasonably prohibit or limit any person in 
respect to access to services offered by such alternative trading system by applying the 
standards established under paragraph (b)(5)(ii)(A) of this section in an unfair or 
discriminatory manner.” §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(B). 
 89. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(ii)(C-D) (2011). 
 90. 17 C.F.R. §242.301(b)(5)(i) (2011). 
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investors from knowing if they are getting the best price for their 
transactions, and that better prices in dark pools could take liquidity out 
of conventional exchanges.91  At the same time, an argument for the 
presence of dark pools is that a lack of pre-trade transparency can allow 
block trades to occur by providing an opportunity for market participants 
to find trading interest for large-size orders without simultaneously 
causing an impact on price.92  Such pre-trade opacity could be beneficial 
to institutional investors, with whom many individuals have their 
pension and 401(k) accounts, that need to trade in large sizes and can 
benefit from this lack of pre-trade transparency.93  In considering the 
regulation of dark pools, the Commission has expressed concern that 
trading in dark pools undermines the concept of creating a national 
market system by creating a two-tiered level of access to information, 
and that the private trading may discourage the display of public interest 
and thereby limit competition.94  These justifications are focused on the 
appearance of a lack of opportunity for the unsophisticated investor, and 
the Commission should continue to emphasize this perspective as it 
evaluates proposals to regulate dark pools. 
For both flash orders and dark pools, in addition to the effects that 
result from how dark pools and flash orders are perceived, the 
Commission should also consider empirical investigations of these 
mechanisms’ effects on different classes of investors when the 
Commission is deciding whether and how to regulate in a way that 
would promote opportunities for wealth accumulation across a broad 
segment of the population.  When we view these proposals from an 
opportunities-based perspective, we should be assessing whether and to 
what extent the presence of flash orders and dark pools creates definitive 
classes between those who are advantaged and those who are not. 
The Commission’s policies and rhetoric with respect to 
opportunities have potentially significant consequences because 
government action can create both the reality and perception of the idea 
that the wealthy are favored and are entitled to even more opportunities.  
When one group, such as the affluent, is believed to have a particular 
sphere of influence over an institution, public trust in that institution can 
 
 91. Hatch, supra note 76, at 1039. 
 92. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61227. 
 93. Id. at 61208. 
 94. 2009 Proposed Rule, supra note 82, at 61211. 
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be weakened because of growing institutional corruption.95  An example 
of the effects of such distrust can be seen in the public’s cynical view 
regarding the impact of campaign contributions.96  Similarly, the public 
has perceived recent economic policies, such as the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (“TARP”), as primarily benefitting wealthy individuals 
and large financial institutions, thereby weakening the public’s trust in 
government institutions.97  Ultimately, the perception that certain 
 
 95. “Institutional corruption does not refer to the knowing violation of any law or 
ethical rule . . . .  It instead describes an influence, financial or otherwise, within an 
economy of influence, that weakens the effectiveness of an institution, especially by 
weakening public trust in that institution.” Lawrence Lessig, Democracy After Citizens 
United, BOSTON REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, available at http://bostonreview.net/ 
BR35.5/lessig.php. 
 96. “The vast majority of Americans believe money buys results in Congress; less 
than a quarter of Americans believe the institution worthy of their trust. When ‘free-
market’ Republicans vote to support milk subsidies or sugar tariffs, or when ‘pro-
consumer’ Democrats vote to exempt used-car dealers from consumer financial-
protection legislation, it is easy to understand the mistrust and hard to believe that the 
influence of money hasn’t weakened the ability of members to serve the principles, or 
even the interests, they were elected to represent.”  Lessig, supra note 95.  See also 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003) (“[The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
of 2002] is the most recent federal enactment designed to purge national politics of 
what was conceived to be the pernicious influence of ‘big money’ campaign 
contributions.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 97. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET 
RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (Oct. 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Con
gress.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP] (“Notwithstanding TARP’s role in bringing the 
financial system back from the brink of collapse, it has been widely reported that the 
American people view TARP with anger, cynicism, and distrust . . . .  The beliefs of 
some, for example . . . that TARP was created in secrecy to transfer wealth from 
taxpayers to Wall Street insiders . . . are only reinforced by Treasury’s failures of 
transparency.”); PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS AND THE 
NATIONAL JOURNAL, GOV’T ECONOMIC POLICIES SEEN AS BOON FOR BANKS AND BIG 
BUSINESS, NOT MIDDLE CLASS OR POOR (The Society for Human Resource 
Management 2010), available at http://people-press.org/report/637/ (“Fully 74% [of 
respondents] say that government policies over the past two years have done a great 
deal (53%) or a fair amount (21%) to help large banks and financial institutions.  
Majorities also say that large corporations (70% great deal/fair amount) and wealthy 
people (57% great deal/fair amount) have been helped.  By contrast, 68% say 
government policies have helped small businesses not at all (29%) or not too much 
(39%); 68% also say middle-class people have received little or no help from these 
policies.  And about the same percentage (64%) says poor people have not been 
helped.”); Sewell Chan, Both Parties Play the Wall Street Card, Sometimes from the 
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policies favor the wealthy can undermine the public’s trust in 
government.98 
Moreover, the expressive message of such government distinctions 
is potentially very powerful.  “These expressive or symbolic dimensions 
of policy are central in many regulatory contexts. They are just as real 
and significant as other dimensions of policy.”99  In fact, “[m]any people 
support law because of the statements made by law, and disagreements 
about law are frequently debates over the expressive content of law.”100  
Thus, the expressive message conveyed by securities regulators in 
making distinctions between different types of investors could, alone, 
have harmful effects on those denied opportunities available to others.101 
 
Bottom of the Deck, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at A16,  available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/us/01wall.html?scp=4&sq=anger%20over%20bail
out&st=cse (explaining the trend during the 2010 Midterm Elections for candidates to 
use anger against Wall Street bailouts and the economic stimulus against political 
opponents). 
 98. See SIGTARP, supra note 97, at 165 (“Accuracy and transparency can enhance 
the public’s understanding of and support for Government programs, whereas 
statements that are less-than-careful or forthright — like those made in [communicating 
about TARP] — may ultimately undermine the public’s understanding and support for 
these same programs. This loss of public support could damage the Government’s 
credibility and have long-term, unintended consequences that actually hamper the 
Government’s ability to respond to crises.”); Frank Rich, Still the Best Congress Money 
Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at WK8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/11/28/opinion/28rich.html (arguing that the recent dissatisfaction the public feels 
with the government stems from the  inability or unwillingness of Congress to deal with 
the influence of “Big Money” in politics); Michael O’Brien, Sanders: ‘Big Money 
Interests Control’ Congress, THE HILL, Dec. 22, 2009, available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/73311-sanders-big-money-interests-
control-congress (quoting Sen. Bernie Sanders: “The truth is -- let me break the bad 
news to the American people -- big money interests control the United States Congress. 
That’s the reality. Some of us, for years . . . have been trying to give the working class, 
middle class, low-income people some power. But the reality is, campaign contributions 
-- What do you think? We bailed out Wall Street; we’re giving insurance companies, 
drug companies breaks here.”). 
 99. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1, 70 (1995). 
 100. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2022 (1996). 
 101. Expressive messages can have a negative effect when they constitute 
expressive harms, such as a state or local government “communicat[ing] its contempt 
for blacks by requiring the racial segregation of public facilities.”  Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 
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Such harmful effects could take the form of less saving102 and 
investment by the non-wealthy as well as greater perceptions of 
unfairness and undemocratic government. 
 
III.  INFORMATION 
If the goal is to expand opportunities to participate in financial 
markets for the purpose of growing one’s wealth, the direct restrictions 
imposed by regulation on access to institutions, such as hedge funds, are 
only one barrier to entry.  Another barrier, which the SEC has attempted 
to tackle in numerous ways, is access to information.  Dark pools and 
flash orders are only one aspect of the larger problem of accessing and 
comprehending the tremendous volume of information regarding 
publicly listed companies, mutual funds, and financial institutions.  The 
SEC has tackled the problem of information barriers primarily through 
disclosure requirements.103  Such an approach is consistent with an 
efficiency/social welfare approach, which would predict that better 
information would improve the functioning of markets, thereby 
increasing social welfare.  An opportunities-based approach, however, 
recognizes that more information does not necessarily create more 
opportunities for the majority of investors. 
The disclosure requirements for publicly listed companies are 
formidable.  Large prospectuses provide detailed information on over 
 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000).  This segregation sends a message that blacks are 
inferior, and need to be separated from the “pure[r]” whites.  Id.  Desiring that the 
government create a positive expressive message, many discriminating restaurant 
owners supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964, wanting the law to help “shift social 
norms and the social meaning of nondiscrimination,” where before it was not socially 
acceptable to avoid discrimination.  Sunstein, supra note 75, at 2043. 
 102. Sarah Molseed, An Ownership Society for All: Community Development 
Financial Institutions as the Bridge Between Wealth Inequality and Asset-Building 
Policies, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 489, 500-01 (2006) (“Many asset-poor 
individuals do not have access to the mainstream financial institutions, such as banks 
and credit unions, that are essential to most asset accumulation. . . . The failure of many 
low-income individuals to access mainstream financial institutions seriously 
undermines any long-term asset accumulation.”). 
 103. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 4, at 417-18 (“A demanding system of mandatory 
disclosure . . . makes up the core of the federal securities laws. . . . [B]y arming 
investors with information, mandatory disclosure promotes informed investor decision 
making, capital market integrity, and capital market efficiency.”). 
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fifty items, including “business development and prospects, legal 
proceedings, properties, financial performance, directors and officers, 
and securities.”104  Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002,105 companies are expected to include even more information 
regarding off-balance sheet transactions, reconciliations of pro-forma 
financial information with the registrant’s financial condition and results 
of operation, insider stock transactions, internal control systems, codes 
of ethics for senior financial officers, the audit committee’s financial 
expert, and CEO and CFO certifications of financial statements.106  In 
addition to these daunting disclosure requirements for individual 
companies, mutual funds, in which most individuals invest their 
retirement accounts, are required to disclose significant amounts of 
information in their prospectuses.  In particular, they must disclose all 
costs, fees, and charges associated with a mutual fund in a variety of 
ways.107  Additionally, mutual funds must provide a statement of the 
fund’s investment objective and investment policies, including those 
regarding the borrowing of money or the issuance of senior securities, 
any involvement in the business of underwriting, the purchasing or 
selling of real estate or commodities, any making of loans, the 
concentration of their investment in particular industries, and the 
particular securities that may be utilized in pursuit of the fund’s 
investment objective.108 
Does all of this mandatory disclosure actually increase the access of 
individuals to the financial markets?  The purpose of disclosure 
requirements has been to combat the problems of asymmetric 
information in the marketplace and thereby allow the markets to work 
 
 104. Id. at 425. 
 105. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 106. Paredes, supra note 4, at 428. 
 107. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 926-27.  In particular, mutual funds must 
disclose all fees and charges associated with a mutual fund as a percentage of net assets, 
the cost in dollars of an investment of $1,000 that earned the fund’s actual return and 
incurred the fund’s actual expenses during that fiscal period, the costs in dollars based 
on the fund’s actual expenses of a $1,000 investment that earned an assumed return of 
five percent, and a narrative explanation of the types of costs charged to the fund.  Id. 
 108. Riggs, Rosselot, & West, supra note 4, at 865-66.  Additional disclosures 
required include the operating policies of the fund, explaining how fund shares can be 
purchased or redeemed, support services provided for investors, and any other features 
that may be relevant to investment in the fund.  Id. at 866. 
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more efficiently.109  If investors know about the plans and financial well-
being of different companies, the theory is that they will be more able to 
channel capital efficiently.110  These determinations will, in turn, allow 
investors to more accurately price assets on the market.111 
The problem with the market failures approach to regulation – that 
is, the provision of excessive information in order to combat the problem 
of inadequate disclosures – is that it does not address the reality that 
more information may have little or no value to investors.  Individuals 
are limited in their ability to absorb and process large amounts of 
information.112  The Nobel laureate Herb Simon recognized the 
“bounded rationality” of individuals.113  This theory recognizes that 
individuals are limited in their ability to process and optimally utilize all 
available information and, instead, will satisfice.114  Even experts cannot 
process all of the information they are given.115  In fact, more 
 
 109. Paredes, supra note 4, at 470-71 (explaining the “lemons market,” caused by 
asymmetric information, in which sellers offer inferior products because they have 
more information about the low quality of these products than the buyers, leading 
buyers to withdraw from the market, a problem mitigated when companies are required 
to disclose accurate information to consumers). 
 110. Paredes, supra note 4, at 471 (“[T]his commitment [to provide comprehensive, 
quality, and truthful disclosures indefinitely] is important because investors want 
assurances that they will have access to the information necessary to value a company’s 
securities.”). 
 111. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 930 (explaining that providing information to 
consumers can lower prices by facilitating product comparison and increasing 
competition). 
 112. Paredes, supra note 4, at 435 (“Cognitive capabilities are scarce resources that 
have to be allocated; because of limited cognitive capabilities, people cannot attend to 
all the information made available to them and cannot evaluate all their choices 
perfectly.”). 
 113. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 
101 (1955) (“[S]ome of the constraints that must be taken as givens in an optimization 
problem may be physiological and psychological limitations of the organism 
(biologically defined) itself.  For example, the maximum speed at which an organism 
can move establishes a boundary on the set of its available behavior alternatives. 
Similarly, limits on computational capacity may be important constraints entering into 
the definition of rational choice under particular circumstances.”). 
 114. Paredes, supra note 4, at 436.  In satisficing, people choose a satisfactory 
outcome as their “aspiration level,” and then work towards reaching this outcome, even 
if some better decision may exist in theory.  Id.  In other words, because individuals do 
not have the cognitive capabilities to optimize, they try to do “the best as [they] can 
under the circumstances.”  Id. 
 115. Id. at 455 (“[E]verybody – experts and non-experts alike – has limited 
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information can potentially cause individuals to make worse 
decisions.116  This is because greater amounts of information make it 
more difficult for individuals to rank which piece of information is most 
important.117  Additionally, investors may turn to heuristic rules of 
thumb, which may lead them to make errors.118  Under the availability 
heuristic, investors place too much weight on more recent and salient 
information.119 
Information about individual companies may not be as relevant to 
 
cognitive abilities. A vast behavioral finance literature suggests that securities market 
professionals, like lay investors, are subject to all sorts of cognitive biases that affect 
investment decisions.”). 
 116. Id. at 419 (“Studies show that at some point, people become overloaded with 
information and make worse decisions than if less information were made available to 
them.”).  For examples of such studies, see David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, 
Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial Reporting 2 (Sept. 2003) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=334940 (“[I]nformation that is presented in salient, easily 
processed form is assumed to be absorbed more easily than information that is less 
salient, or that is only implicit in the public information set. . . . Thus, investors neglect 
relevant aspects of the economic environments they face.  For example, investors may 
neglect the distinctive features of different divisions of a diversified firm, or may not 
adequately adjust their interpretations of disclosures to take into account the strategic 
incentives of firms to manipulate observers’ perceptions.”); Russell Korobkin, The 
Efficiency of Managed Care “Patient Protection” Laws: Incomplete Contracts, 
Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 52-55 (1999) 
(arguing that numerous choices in healthcare coverage options can cause individuals to 
select simpler, less accurate decision-making processes in order to handle the amount of 
information they have to process); Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information 
Overload Paradigm in Consumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436, 437 
(1984) (“In real life, consumers are often faced with large amounts and a wide variety 
of information, which is so prevalent and obtrusive in the environment. Although 
consumers develop mechanisms for limiting their intake of information, their limited 
processing capacity can become cognitively overloaded if they attempt to process ‘too 
much’ information in a limited time, and this can result in confusion, cognitive strain, 
and other dysfunctional consequences.”). 
 117. Paredes, supra note 4, at 441.  Each decision an individual is choosing between 
contains several attributes that are relevant to the consideration of the decision and that 
influence which alternative to choose.  Id. at 437.  The more attributes per choice, the 
closer individuals get to becoming mentally overloaded and making worse decisions.  
Id. at 441. 
 118. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 110 (2006). 
 119. Id. 
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the unsophisticated individual investor as is information about mutual 
funds.  Of the 117.2 million U.S. households in 2009, 43%, or 50.4 
million total households, owned mutual funds.120  These households 
represent 87.1 million individual mutual fund shareholders.121  The type 
of information that is likely to matter, therefore, for individual investors 
pertains to the risk, return, and fees of a mutual fund. 
An opportunities-based policy might require that risk and return 
measures be incorporated by providing detailed descriptions of a mutual 
fund’s past performance (monthly, quarterly, and annual in order for 
individuals to see the volatility of the fund over time), the types of assets 
in which it invests, and how its performance compares to a standard 
index, such as the S&P 500.  In fact, mutual funds already make such 
disclosures and are required to do so under rules and amendments 
adopted in 2004 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
Regulation S-X.122  What would assist investors further is if the 
performance of mutual funds was compared in an accessible format to 
those of others of the same type and to mutual funds overall.123  This 
could be done for risk and return.  Simple explanations showing what 
the individual’s investment would be in ten years if it continued to grow 
at the current rate of return, a historical average rate of return, or an 
alternative rate of return could assist investors in obtaining a more 
complete understanding of their current investments.  Risk measures 
would be far more difficult to compare, but representing investment 
gains for different plausible return levels could be a great benefit to 
investors. 
The SEC has also regulated mutual funds with respect to fee 
 
 120. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PROFILE OF MUTUAL FUND SHAREHOLDERS 
3, 2009 (Winter 2010). 
 121. Id. at 1. 
 122. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26372, 69 
Fed. Reg. 11244 (Mar. 9, 2004). 
 123. See Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 935-37 (arguing for the reporting of 
expenses by mutual funds to be done in a way that leads to easy comparison by 
investors, such as requiring funds to calculate their expense ratio relative to other funds 
in their comparable investment classification and to report this to the SEC); Paredes, 
supra note 4, at 476 (supporting the continued use of charts, graphs, and tables in SEC 
filings so that information is presented in a more easily digestible way). 
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disclosures.124  Mutual funds are required to disclose transactional fees 
(the sales loads and redemption fees), as well as management fees and 
12b-1 fees (fees for marketing and distribution activities).125  Fee 
disclosure requirements, however, fail to give investors a comparative 
basis for their costs.  When investors only see the costs associated with 
the fund in which they are investing, they have no means to evaluate 
whether the price of their investment is justified.126  Such a lack of 
comparative information makes it more difficult for the investors in 
mutual funds to monitor their cost and quality.127  While the SEC’s 
online fee calculator is a helpful step in the right direction,128 measures 
that require investors to take initiative and do extra work are far less 
effective than providing the information directly in an easily accessible 
format.129 
Simplification of information allows more individuals to access the 
financial markets in ways that will effectively increase their wealth.  For 
instance, individuals may be paying more fees for the same types of 
passively managed index funds without knowing it because the 
 
 124. See Consolidated Disclosure of Mutual Fund Expenses, Investment Company 
Act Release No. 16244, 53 Fed. Reg. 3192 (Feb. 4, 1988) (“Investment Company Act 
Release”). 
 125. Id.; Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 925-27; Investment Company Act Release, 
supra note 124. 
 126. Cf. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 936 (“[P]roviding operating expense and 
return disclosures in a truly comparative framework is much more likely to elicit an 
informed choice on the part of investors than if operating expenses or return disclosures 
are made in isolation.”). 
 127. See id. at 937 (Having information comparing a fund to other comparable funds 
makes it more likely that directors will engage in proper oversight of their fund’s 
services and fees because “[c]onsistent with the wise maxim that you manage what is 
measured, the independent directors are far more likely to probe the causes for above-
average expense ratios than when not aware that the fund’s expense ratio is above 
average.”). 
 128. See Calculating Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n 
(Aug. 10, 2010) http://sec.gov/investor/tools/mfcc/mfcc-int.htm.  This resource from the 
SEC allows for the comparison of the fees and expenses of up to three mutual funds, up 
to three ETFs, or the share classes of the same mutual fund, on FINRA’s Mutual Fund 
Expense Analyzer.  All that is needed is the full name of the fund or its ticker symbol, 
but you can also search for this information using key words. 
 129. See Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 932 (“Because processing of information is 
costly, people tend to accept information in the format in which it is given rather than 
expending cognitive effort to transform it.”). 
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information is too complex for them to absorb in a timely way.130  
Mandating mutual funds to provide expense ratios, the expense ratio 
range for the comparable group, and the percentile ranking of their 
expense ratio within this group, would greatly reduce the information 
costs associated with pricing in the mutual fund market.131 
This idea is analogous to what has been discussed by Professor 
Elizabeth Warren in promoting disclosures of credit card terms.132  
Under the Credit Card Act of 2009, credit cards must now clearly 
disclose, the timing necessary to pay the balance of a credit card bill if 
the minimum payment is made (including the total cost of doing so as 
well as the minimum monthly payment required to pay off the balance 
within 36 months), as well as information about late payments 
(including the date after which such a fee will be charged and any 
increase in the interest rate for late payments), and an electronic method 
for credit card disclosures to become available.133  This information must 
 
 130. In one study, over eighty percent of respondents believed that higher 
maintenance charges signified a better performing fund.  In a more detailed study, a 
sample of fifty-two S&P 500 index funds showed that those with poorer performance 
had higher distribution costs and yet grew their customer base at a higher rate than 
lower-cost funds.  The biggest portion of the difference in performance between funds 
is attributable to the higher management expenses and costs.  This problem could be 
impacted by the fact that individuals are not receiving enough information to make 
good comparisons among products, or that the information is not being presented in a 
way that makes it processible enough to make rational decisions. See id. at 909-11. 
 131. Cox & Payne, supra note 36, at 936. 
 132. See Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer: The Case for Regulation, 
HARVARD MAGAZINE, May-June 2008, at 34 (suggesting the development of a Financial 
Product Safety Commission that would establish guidelines for consumer disclosure, 
collect and report data about the uses of different financial products, judge the safety of 
new products, and require the modification of products judged as dangerous to 
consumers, in order to ensure that credit cards and other financial products are 
sufficient to meet “minimum safety standards” and that uniform disclosures would 
make it easy for consumers to compare products); Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing 
Consumer Financial Products Regulation Before the House Financial Services 
Committee, 111th Cong. 5 (June 24, 2009) (testimony of Elizabeth Warren, Leo 
Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/warren_testimony.pdf 
[hereinafter Regulatory Restructuring] (arguing that credit card companies should be 
required to provide uniform information about “the interest rate, the penalty rate, when 
a penalty will be imposed, and how to get the free gift” on a two-page document in 
order to facilitate product comparison by consumers). 
 133. Credit CARD Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). 
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be provided in an easily accessible format.  Warren has further proposed 
having a simple, two-page long credit card contract that is clear, easy to 
read, and highlights key information (interest rate, penalty rate, when 
penalties are assessed, and how to get free gifts) in a straightforward 
way.134  Each lender would have a similar contract where it would fill in 
the blanks with its company’s information, creating a quick and easy 
way for consumers to compare competitors.135  Such a proposal, if 
applied to mutual funds, would help investors better accomplish one of 
the primary goals of disclosure – to discriminate on the basis of 
quality.136 
It is not necessary for the SEC to eliminate any of its current 
disclosure requirements.  Eliminating some disclosure requirements 
could have costs, such as omitting information that is more useful than 
what remains disclosed, taking away information that may be useful to 
some market participants but not others, and eroding investor confidence 
by making the market seem less regulated and therefore more prone to 
fraud and inefficiency.137  Providing a two-tiered system of information, 
however, could be a good way to offer summary information that an 
individual investor could easily understand.138  For mutual funds, this 
could consist of graphics that show the mutual fund’s costs and 
performance relative to others in its category and as compared to mutual 
funds as a whole. 
For individual companies, it may be more difficult to determine the 
most important information that an investor should have.  If the goal of 
 
 134. Regulatory Restructuring, supra note 132, at 5. 
 135. Id. (“Picture it—a credit card contract that is two pages long, clear and easy to 
read, and that has a few well-lit blanks—the interest rate, the penalty rate, when a 
penalty will be imposed, and how to get the free gift. Each lender can decide how to fill 
in the blanks for the cards it wants to sell, and each customer can make quick 
comparisons to see who is offering the best deals.”) 
 136. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 470 (describing the securities market as having a 
“lemons problem,” where “the challenge for buyers is to identify quality, which buyers 
have difficulty doing without the necessary information to distinguish between superior 
and inferior items or the ability otherwise to determine quality at a reasonable cost”). 
 137. See id. at 450, 460, 462. 
 138. See id. at 461 (advocating a disclosure system in which one set of disclosures is 
provided to experts, while a different set of disclosures is provided to the ordinary 
investor).  This tiered form of disclosure is useful in that it provides the information 
most useful for two very different types of investors in the way that is most 
understandable to them, which for individual investors could be a simplified version of 
the most important general information. 
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policy is to promote the expansion of opportunity in wealth 
accumulation, the greatest gains in achieving this goal are likely to be 
derived from beginning with the types of investments made by the most 
people and assisting them to gain as much as possible from them.  This 
approach would likely result in a focus on mutual funds and pension 
funds.139  The majority of investors in individual companies are 
institutional investors140 who, though still limited in their cognitive 
abilities, have better resources to help process and summarize large 
volumes of information about individual companies.141 
What information is most relevant and how it should be presented 
may require empirical research into what information is most easily 
processed and used by investors.142  In sum, the notions underlying 
regulation in the form of mandating many disclosures may be founded 
on a myth: 
A fair amount of what the Commission does . . . is in the name of 
 
 139. In 2009, an estimated 87 million individual investors owned mutual funds and 
held 84 percent of total mutual fund assets at year-end. Altogether, 50.4 million 
households, or 43 percent of all U.S. households, owned funds.  Mutual funds 
represented a significant component of many U.S. households’ financial holdings in 
2009.  Among households owning mutual funds, the median amount invested in mutual 
funds was $80,000.  INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACT BOOK 80 (2009).  “[O]ver 50 percent of pension fund investments are undertaken 
through the purchase of shares in mutual funds . . . .”  WORLD BANK, Private Capital 
Flows to Developing Countries: The Road to Financial Integration 129 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1997). 
 140. Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 787, 801 (2010) (“Institutional investors have become very 
common and now account for the vast majority of shareholding, but they have failed to 
actively participate in corporate governance.”). 
 141. See Paredes, supra note 4, at 455 (“Although the risk of information overload 
may be eased for experts, it is not eliminated.”).  However, securities market 
professionals can learn from past mistakes and often gain valuable experience over 
time.  Id.  In addition, experts can work with other individuals to help by hiring people, 
dividing tasks, and allocating resources.  Id.  “In large part, the expert filters are in 
reality collections of individuals housed in financial institutions that can bring lots of 
human and other resources to bear on a task.”  Id. 
 142. Id. at 473-74 (advocating for further research, such as interviews, surveys, 
laboratory experiments, or the study of historical data to expand existing behavioral 
finance literature and to determine how individuals process information and make 
investment decisions, particularly looking at the level of information overload for 
different securities market participants and what information is most useful and should 
be disclosed). 
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making disclosure “accessible” to the average investor.  That 
sentiment has led to the creation of an awkward myth-story in which 
probably few have deep faith.  In this story, the typical retail investor 
is very much an earnest and rational person, but with bounded 
capacity.  He wants a substantial amount of government-mandated 
disclosure and evaluates it fairly carefully in making his investment 
decision so long as it is packaged properly (e.g., in “plain English”).  
To be sure, some investors actually do this.  But the Commission has 
never studied investor behavior deeply enough to say, publicly at 
least, what percentage of investors read or understand these 
documents, or what influence the fundamental analysis-oriented 
disclosure has on their investment decisions.  We now know from 
research in behavioral economics that this belief is unfounded.  
Regulatory policy needs to evolve to reflect that reality.143 
Thus, an opportunities-based perspective, unlike a social welfare 
approach, demands not that more information be provided, but rather 
that the most relevant information for the majority of investors be 
provided in as accessible a format as possible. 
 
IV.  SAVING US FROM OURSELVES 
A host of behavioral biases that impact investment behavior 
compounds the problem of information overload.144  Such biases are 
examples of irrational behaviors that are not taken into account in 
traditional economic models.145  Consequently, the traditional social 
 
 143. Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 173 (2002). 
 144. See infra Parts A-C. 
 145. “For most of the past two centuries, economic thinking has been dominated by 
the concept of Homo economicus. The hypothetical Economic Man knows what he 
wants; his preferences can be expressed mathematically in terms of a ‘utility function.’ 
And his choices are driven by rational calculations about how to maximize that 
function: whether consumers are deciding between corn flakes or shredded wheat, or 
investors are deciding between stocks and bonds, those decisions are assumed to be 
based on comparisons of the ‘marginal utility,’ or the added benefit the buyer would get 
from acquiring a small amount of the alternatives available.”  Paul Krugman, Who Was 
Milton Friedman?, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 15, 2007), available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2007/feb/15/who-was-milton-
friedman/?pagination=false.  See also DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL, 
REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION xix (Harper Perennial 2009) (“In this book, when I 
mention the rational economic model, I refer to the basic assumption that most 
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welfare approach would not acknowledge them as one of the standard 
market failures to be addressed by government intervention. 
Nevertheless, these behavioral biases have significant impacts on 
investors.  They lead traders to trade too frequently (thereby reducing 
their returns by what they incur in fees),146 refuse to realize their losses 
when they should,147 and misjudge the probability of events.148  
Regulation can facilitate wealth accumulation by assisting investors in 
mitigating the impacts of their own biases on their investment behaviors.  
In this section I will describe three types of biases and some 
opportunities-based regulatory proposals that might help investors be 
less negatively impacted by their own biases. 
A.  OVERCONFIDENCE 
One behavioral bias that has been well documented is 
overconfidence, or over-optimism.149  Overconfidence leads to excessive 
 
economists and many of us hold about human nature – the simple and compelling idea 
that we are capable of making the right decisions for ourselves.”). 
 146. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12. 
 147. This behavior is defined as “loss aversion,” a behavioral trait that causes 
individuals to “continue [to hold] a losing position in hopes of reversing their losses 
without regard to disclosure.”  Id. at 22. 
 148. Id. at 16. 
 149. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 279, 316 (2000) (“[I]nvestors may act with overconfidence, placing too 
little weight on low-probability risks and justifying their prior decisions even when 
misguided.  Similarly, investors may act with ‘hindsight bias,’ placing too much weight 
on past performance in projecting future performance.”) (citing Jonathan Clements, 
Riskphobes are Taking Two Big Gambles, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1998, at C1); Choi, 
supra note 118, at 110 (“Investors may make decisions with overconfidence or 
overoptimism.  Male investors in particular may trade excessively in securities.”); Choi 
& Pritchard, supra note 36 at 12 (“Commentators have argued that investors often do 
not recognize how difficult [the choices they face] are and instead rely on a belief that 
their innate abilities will lead to a good investment result.”); Langevoort, supra note 
143, at 146 (“[P]erhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that 
people are overconfident. . . . This bias has a comparative dimension to it: people are 
overconfident in their skills vis-à-vis others. Indeed, far more than fifty percent of a 
sampling of active investors will rate themselves as above average as compared to their 
peers at the task of investing.”); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of 
the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 166 (2006) (“Investors . . . can be overconfident in 
their abilities to assess risks and to make wise investment decisions.  Most investors 
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trading and a reduction in returns due to transaction fees.150  One study 
examined the investment performance of a large number of online 
brokerage accounts,151 which are held by those who think that they can 
make their own trading decisions without the assistance of a stockbroker 
providing advice.  This group has been the fastest growing segment of 
the brokerage industry over the last few years.152 What the researchers 
found is that the rate of trading increased once the accounts were 
established, especially after an initial spurt of good performance (or 
good luck).153  Notwithstanding this increasing volume of trading, 
overall average performance lagged behind what a more passive, well-
diversified trading strategy would generate.154  All of the lag could be 
traced to the costs (e.g., commissions) associated with active trading.155  
Simply put, “[o]verconfident investors will overestimate the value of 
their private information, causing them to trade too actively and, 
consequently, to earn below-average returns.”156 
Other evidence regarding overconfidence relates to investor 
behavior during bull markets.  The number of day traders increased as 
the bull market peaked in the late 1990s.157  Day traders are able to place 
their trades directly online, giving them a sense of empowerment and 
control, which can exacerbate their overconfidence.158  The 
overconfident behavior of day traders has been likened to a “new form 
 
overrate their stock-picking abilities and believe that their investment skills are above 
average.  Studies have shown that investors consistently overestimate both the future 
performance and the past performance of their investments.”); Simon Gervais & 
Terrance Odean, Learning To Become Overconfident, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 1, 1 (2001) 
(‘“Traders who successfully forecast next period dividends improperly update their 
beliefs; they overweight the possibility that their success was due to superior ability. In 
so doing they become overconfident.”). 
 150. See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.  See also Nisha Patel, IX. ETFs and 
Mutual Funds: Changes in the Industry, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 345, 348-49 
(2008) (“[When] the investor makes small, frequent investments . . . the fee is applied to 
each transaction, amounting to heavy broker fees.”). 
 151. Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The 
Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000). 
 152. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147. 
 153. Id. at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800. 
 154. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800. 
 155. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 147; Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800. 
 156. Barber & Odean, supra note 151, at 800. 
 157. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12. 
 158. Ripken, supra note 149, at 167. 
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of casino gambling” that has caused these traders to “frequently los[e] 
family savings and [go] into debt, essentially eliminating their own 
retirement incomes.”159  This type of trading can also be detrimental to 
the market as a whole, making it more volatile and stock prices more 
artificial, rising and falling on a measure of “consumer confidence” 
rather than any actual change in the value of the company.160 
A third example of overconfident behavior is that investors believe 
that they know more about the value of their employer’s stock than the 
rest of the market.  Their overconfidence leads investors to believe that 
their own company is better than others and as a result will perform 
better in the market.161  Hence, they invest heavily in their employer’s 
stock, which is an obvious mistake from a diversification perspective.162  
More than 20% of defined contribution pension money is invested in the 
employer’s stock.163  When employees believe their company is doing 
well financially and are optimistic about their company’s future 
prospects, they may have additional emotional reasons to invest heavily 
in their employer’s stock: euphoria, exuberance, greed, and general 
feelings of positivity, well-being, or goodness.164  An example of this 
behavior leading to disastrous consequences was displayed in the case of 
Enron employees investing too heavily in Enron stock, and suffering 
substantial losses as a result.165 
 
 159. Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage: 
Problems with the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform The Social 
Security Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1416 (2001). 
 160. Id. at 1416-17. 
 161. Ripken, supra note 149, at 164. 
 162. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12.      
 163. Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, & Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Law and Economics of Company Stock in 401 (k) Plans, 50 J.L. & ECON. 45, 47 
(2007) (“[S]ome 11 million participants in U.S. defined-contribution plans have more 
than 20 percent of their account balance invested in company stock.  Within this group, 
some 5 million have more than 60 percent of their account balance concentrated in their 
employer’s stock.”).  See also Gur Huberman and Paul Sengmueller, Performance and 
Employer Sock in 401(k) Plans, 8 REV. FIN. 403, 404 (2004) (finding that for 401(k) 
plans that offer company stock as an investment choice, individuals invest 36.3% in 
company stock).  Respondents to a Gallup survey view their own employer’s stock as 
safer than a diversified stock fund, domestic or international.  Gur Huberman, 
Familiarity Breeds Investment, 14 REV. FIN. STUD. 659, 660 (2001). 
 164. Peter H. Huang, Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1059, 1092 (2003). 
 165. See Id. at 1093; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Employees’ Retirement Plan Is a Victim 
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B.  FRAMING 
A second cognitive bias in the behavioral literature that results in 
several distinct investment behaviors is framing.166  People appear to 
approach risk-taking differently depending on the framing of the choice 
before them.167When evaluating a potential gain, people exhibit a strong 
degree of risk aversion.168At the same time, if investors are prompted to 
see the choice as one of trying to avoid a loss of something that is 
currently possessed, they tend to be more risk-seeking.169As a result of 
framing effects, people may hold on to their losing stocks too long, and 
sell their winners too readily.170  An investor may sell winners too 
readily in a “quest for pride,” as closing a stock account at a gain 
induces a feeling of pride, and may hold a loser too long in an effort to 
avoid a feeling of regret from closing an account at a loss.171  Selling 
winners too readily can have a negative impact on an individual for tax 
purposes, because short-term gains are taxed at a higher rate than long-
term gains.172  Nevertheless, perhaps because regret is stronger than 
pride, and can be experienced on either side of the market (if the 
investor sells a winner too early, it can also create a feeling of regret 
later on if the price continues to rise), inaction is favored over action, 
and an investor is more likely to hold a stock than to sell it.173  Thus, 
when investors’ stocks have lost value, they may hold on to the stocks 
 
as Enron Tumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/ 
gst/fullpage.html?res=9A00E0DC143AF931A15752C1A9679C8B63&pagewanted=1  
(indicating that at the end of 2000, more than half of the Enron 401(k)’s $2.1 billion 
value consisted of Enron stock, which, by November 2001, lost 94% of its value.). 
 166. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144.  “[A] frame is a central organizing idea or 
story line that provides meaning; it suggests what the controversy is about, the essence 
of the issue.”   Paul R. Brewer and Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens’ 
Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929, 
931 (2005) (quoting W. A. Gamson & A. Modigliani, The Changing Political Culture of 
Affirmative Action 143 in 3 Research in political sociology (R. D. Braungart, ed., 
1987)). 
 167. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id.; see also Terrence Odean, Are Investors Reluctant To Realize Their Losses?, 
53 J. FIN. 1775 (1998); Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition To Sell Winners 
Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long: Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777 (1985). 
 171. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 170, at 782. 
 172. Id. at 778, 786. 
 173. Id. at 782. 
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longer than warranted in hope of reversing the losses.174  This loss 
aversion may lead investors to hold on to losing stocks longer than 
optimal from a tax planning perspective.175  Conversely, investors that 
make large investment gains may not value the gains as highly as the 
principal, leading them to take on excessive risk with their gains 
(treating the gains much like “house” money in a casino).176 
C.  MISJUDGING PROBABILITIES 
More generally, investors are often simply poor judges of 
probabilities.177  Investors may under weigh low probability, high 
magnitude risks if no obvious examples of the risks have recently been 
brought to their attention.178  By contrast, once a big event happens – 
such as the Enron scandal – investors may overreact, unduly 
emphasizing the risk of fraud.179  Immediately after the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals in the United States, the net volume of money 
flowing into mutual funds turned negative for a period of time, even 
though the holders of diversified mutual funds were unlikely to suffer 
any significant reduction in their returns from fraud at any particular 
company.180  Money managers may also discount small, low probability 
risks and act overconfidently, as they are also subject to behavioral 
 
 174. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 13. 
 175. See id.  See also Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144; Odean, supra note 170 
(reporting that despite tax advantages investors were more willing to sell winning 
positions than losing ones); Shefrin & Statman, supra note 170, at 785-88. 
 176. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 13.  See also Nicholas Barberis, Ming 
Huang & Tano Santos, Prospect Theory and Asset Prices, 66 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2001) 
(arguing that risk aversion will be reduced after the revelation of good news that 
increases the price of a stock); Richard Thaler & E.J. Johnson, Gambling with the 
House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky 
Choice, 36 MGMT. SCI. 199 (1990) (finding that people are more willing to take on risks 
with money that was recently won). 
 177. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12. 
 178. Id.      
 179. Id.  See also Peter Klibanoff, Owen Lamony & Thierry A. Wizman, Investor 
Reaction to Salient News in Closed-end Country Funds, 53 J. FIN. 673 (1999) (finding 
that investors react more strongly to prominent events, defined as those reported on the 
front page of the New York Times). 
 180. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 12 (citing Shaheen Pasha, Redemptions 
Aren’t Lone Villain, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at D13 (reporting that “investors pulled 
a net $28.47 billion from stock funds in July, beating even the $23.6 billion in 
withdrawals that . . . were made in September following the terrorist attacks”)).   
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biases.181  For example, when failing to meet a perceived benchmark, a 
money manager may take an overly risky position in an attempt to 
“catch up.”182  Money managers are also subject to several other biases, 
including underreacting to unfavorable information and overreacting to 
favorable information.183 
D.  A ROLE FOR REGULATORY NUDGES 
In sum, some of the ways in which investors reduce their prospects 
for wealth accumulation are by trading too frequently,184 holding on to 
losses when they should accept sunk costs,185 being excessively risky 
with their gains,186 and overreacting to new information.187  The impacts 
of all of these behavioral biases could be mitigated with regulatory 
nudges in ways that could enhance wealth accumulation.188  In a free 
market system, we should preserve the rights of investors to make the 
decisions they wish to make based on the information they have or 
believe they have, whether accurate or not.189  Regulation can, however, 
 
 181. Id. at 17-18. 
 182. Id. at 17; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for 
Law from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 
CAL. L. REV. 627, 643 (1996) (“A string of losses can cause the agent to assume more 
risk simply to get back to even, especially if failure to do so might result in termination 
and severe reputational penalty.”). 
 183. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 18. 
 184. See supra Part IV.A. 
 185. See supra Part IV.B. 
 186. See supra Part IV.B. 
 187. See supra Part IV.C. 
 188. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 72 (Yale Univ. Press 2008) (stating that in 
order to protect people from making irrational blunders, they should be offered “nudges 
that are most likely to help and least likely to inflict harm”).  See id. at 81-100 
(providing examples of different scenarios that are likely to produce errors leading to 
suboptimal outcomes, along with potential  “nudges” as solutions to prevent or mitigate 
these errors). 
 189. See Allison Clare Gordon, The “Day Trading” Phenomenon: An Educated 
Investment or a Day at the Casino?, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 353, 375 (2001) (“Most 
opponents, including Senator Phil Gramm, the Senate Banking Committee Chairman, 
contest the regulatory proposal, because ‘[y]ou can’t protect people from making bad 
decisions.’  Moreover, such regulations encroach on investors’ freedom and privacy.”); 
John H. Walsh, Can Regulation Protect “Suckers” and “Fools” From Themselves?  
Reflections on the Rhetoric of Investors and Investor Protection Under the Federal 
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use certain tools to prompt investors in the event that they are prone to 
behavioral biases to which they would like to be less prone.190 
Simple regulatory devices could be of great benefit to investors.  
For example, when individuals sign up for a brokerage account, they 
could be asked to pre-commit, even if this is not a binding commitment, 
to no more than a certain number of trades per month or to remain 
within a certain cap of trading fees per month.191  Each time they trade 
they could be reminded of their limit and of how many trades/fees they 
have left relative to their pre-committed cap.  This pre-commitment need 
not be binding because investors may have extenuating circumstances – 
investors may need to liquidate their funds and have the right to do so – 
but such a device would remind investors of the investment decisions 
they previously made.  It could serve as a nudge to reconsider before 
 
Securities Laws, 8 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 188, 239 (2008) (“In a true free market . . . 
investors are responsible for their own decisions, good or bad. This responsibility leads 
them to vigorously analyze companies before they invest, using independent financial 
analysts. In our heavily regulated environment, however, investors and analysts equate 
SEC compliance with reputability. The more we look to the government to protect us 
from investment mistakes, the less competition there is for truly independent 
evaluations of investment risk.”); Joseph W. Singer, Things That We Would Like to 
Take for Granted: Minimum Standards For the Legal Framework of a Free and 
Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 139, 143 (2008) (“Under the theory of 
liberty championed by John Stuart Mill, individuals are best suited to determine what is 
in their own interest; it is a violation of autonomy for courts or legislatures to act 
paternalistically to protect individuals from their own mistakes on the ground that these 
government officials know better than individuals what is in their best interest.  The 
ability of individuals to choose their own ends and to determine the course of their own 
lives is fundamental to liberty.”). 
 190. Choi & Pritchard, supra note 36, at 52 (noting that “[l]arger institutional 
investors may have enough self-awareness of their own susceptibility to behavioral 
biases to appreciate a regime that protects them against such biases”).  Regulation can 
be desirable to many individuals, if it can encourage them to make better choices.  For 
example, “many smokers, drinkers, and overeaters are willing to pay third parties to 
help them make better decisions.”  Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 7.  “When 
people have a hard time predicting how their choices will end up affecting their lives, 
they have less to gain by numerous options and perhaps even by choosing for 
themselves.  A nudge might be welcomed.”  Id. at 76. 
 191. The fees associated with the number of trades could speedily accumulate.  For 
example, in addition to the annual $20 account service fee, Vanguard’s standard 
brokerage services account charges $7 for each of the first 25 trades, and $20 for each 
trade thereafter.  See Schedules VANGARD BROKERAGE SERVICES 
COMMISSION AND FEE SCHEDULES, available at https://personal.vanguard.com/ 
us/whatweoffer/stocksbondscds/feescommissions (last visited Nov. 24, 2010). 
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engaging in unnecessary trading. 
A similar commitment device applying to both brokerage fund and 
mutual fund accounts could prompt investors to determine how much of 
a loss they are willing to tolerate and at what gain they would like to 
sell.  Alternatively, investors could commit to invest in a particular 
portfolio for a set period and pre-commit to a penalty if they withdraw 
early.  Investors should be prompted to make these decisions at the 
initiation of an investment account.  If investors do not respond to a 
prompt pertaining to a certain amount of gain or loss in the portfolio 
within a specified amount of time, they could be required to decide 
ahead of time whether the investments should continue or gains and 
losses should be realized. 
These commitment devices are not unlike the options individuals 
now have vis-à-vis debt instruments.  With respect to credit cards, 
individuals can choose to have their credit card payments automatically 
deducted from their bank account in the amount of the minimum 
payment or in the amount of the total balance due.192  The rationale for 
such commitment devices in the credit card context is that by simply 
allowing or recommending payment of the minimum balance, 
individuals may become anchored to pay only the minimum, which 
maximizes interest charges over time, rather than making the alternative 
decision to pay off the full bill and minimize interest charges.193  In the 
same way, investors could become anchored to hold on to their 
investments as long as the market prices are within some predetermined 
range of movement.  Such simple pre-commitment devices could help 
mitigate the problems of over-reaction to news.  If investors are within 
their target price range for a stock, for instance, a range of not selling if 
within twenty percent above or below their initial purchase price, then 
they may be less likely to decide to purchase more stock on the 
availability of good news or to sell at the appearance of bad news, as 
 
 192. See, e.g., Dawn Allcot, How To: Automatically Pay Your Credit Card Bill 
Each Month, CREDITSHOUT BLOG (Feb. 19, 2010)), http //creditshout.com(stating that 
most credit card companies offer the option to have the bill automatically paid from a 
checking account each month, either by the minimum payment, statement ending 
balance, or another fixed amount). 
 193. Thaler and Sunstein make the point that individuals already receive a “nudge” 
from companies to simply pay the minimum balance each month.  They propose that 
the government require companies to provide the alternative option of paying of the full 
amount each month, so as to “nudge” individuals to minimize their interest charges.  
See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 188, at 144. 
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they know that they will be prompted when they reach their own 
personal trigger point for a decision.  They may be less likely to feel the 
need to react to the news when they get it.  While this result could lead 
to an under reaction bias,194 the extent of this bias is likely to depend on 
the range of pre-commitment options individuals select.  Regulations 
proposed on a pilot basis coupled with empirical research would provide 
excellent opportunities to study the effects of experimenting with 
various pre-commitment devices.  If such pre-commitment devices save 
individuals transaction costs and promote more thoughtful, long-term 
investing, then they would serve the goal of promoting wealth 
accumulation across different sectors of society. 
 
V.  INCENTIVES FOR FINANCIAL ADVISERS AND MANAGERS 
In order to promote opportunities for wealth accumulation, 
securities regulation must take into account the reality that a majority of 
retail investors delegate their investment decisions to financial 
professionals.195  They do so by investing in mutual funds, investing in 
pension funds, relying on money managers, and occasionally, for high 
net worth individuals, investing in hedge funds.196  Their wealth 
 
 194. Langevoort, supra note 143, at 144 (defining this phenomenon as based on 
cognitive conservatism: an extremely robust behavioral construct showing that people 
change their views slowly even in the face of persuasive evidence, or people cling as 
long as possible to what they previously believed to be true). 
 195. Sixty percent of U.S. households reported that they had an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan—that is, they had assets in DC plan accounts, were receiving or 
expecting to receive benefits from DB plans, or both.  Eighty million, or 68 percent, of 
U.S. households reported that they had employer-sponsored retirement plans, IRAs, or 
both in May 2009.  INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY 
FACT BOOK 96 (2009).  At year-end 2009, total IRA assets totaled $4.2 trillion.  Id. at 
98.  Mutual fund assets held in IRAs were $2.0 trillion, and assets managed by mutual 
funds were the largest component of IRA assets, followed by the securities held directly 
through brokerage accounts ($1.5 trillion).  Id.  The mutual fund industry’s share of the 
IRA market increased to an estimated 46 percent at year-end 2009.  Id.  Investors held 
roughly the same amount of mutual fund assets in IRAs as they did in employer-
sponsored DC plans.  Id. at 114.  Among investors owning mutual fund shares outside 
of retirement plans at work, 77 percent own fund shares through professional financial 
advisers.  Id. at 68. 
 196. See Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, Securities Act Release No. 
9128, 75 Fed. Reg. 47064, 47065 (Aug. 4, 2010) (proposed July 21, 2010) (“More than 
87 million Americans, representing slightly less than half of all households, own mutual 
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accumulation, therefore, depends in great part on the behavior of these 
financial professionals.  The behavior of these professionals, in turn, 
depends on the performance incentives they face - namely how they are 
paid.197 
While a social welfare approach to regulation would say that 
government intervention is only needed to mitigate principal-agent 
problems by, for instance, mandating disclosure by various financial 
agents to their investor principals,198 an opportunities-based perspective 
would deem the provision of information insufficient to promote wealth 
accumulation.  If the majority of the middle and lower income segments 
of society are relying on financial professionals to help them accumulate 
wealth, then a goal of securities regulation should be to promote 
incentives that better serve the wealth accumulation of these groups.  In 
many cases, the current incentives of financial professionals favor their 
own wealth accumulation over that of their clients. 
For instance, the performance of most mutual fund managers and 
other financial professionals is assessed, in terms of the fees they collect, 
 
funds . . . [and] most fund investors buy through intermediaries.”); SEC Release No. 
IA-2107, Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 
available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/ic-25925.htm (proposed Feb. 5, 2003) (noting 
that “millions of investors . . . invest in funds, participate in pension funds managed by 
investment advisers, or use the services of a personal financial planner or money 
manager,” and that 5,030 funds and 7,790 advisers are currently registered with the 
SEC, collectively control[ling] over $21 trillion of assets, and engag[ing] in tens of 
millions of transactions each year); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund 
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 282 (2009) 
(“That most individuals cannot invest in hedge funds, however, has not hurt their 
popularity. The assets managed by hedge funds have grown at stratospheric rates, from 
$40 billion in 1990 to more than $1.7 trillion in 2007.”). 
 197. Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 877 (1992) (stating that money managers have 
incentives to improve portfolio performance to increase asset-based management fees); 
D. Bruce Johnsen, Myths About Mutual Fund Fees: Economic Insights on Jones v. 
Harris, 35 J. CORP. L. 561, 608 (2010) (stating that mutual fund advisers will put more 
effort into picking stocks when incentive fees are used to condition compensation on 
investment performance); Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: 
The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 995 
(2006) (noting that it is “reasonable for investors to depend on the manager’s 
performance fee to help align the manager’s incentives with the best interests of the 
fund’s investors”). 
 198. See Mahoney, supra note 7, at 1048. 
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on no lengthier period than on an annual basis.199  Investors are provided 
with quarterly reports for mutual fund performance relative to some 
benchmark, such as the S&P 500.200  Mutual fund advisers are typically 
compensated with a fee based on the percentage of total assets under 
their management.201  Each year, mutual funds can charge performance 
fees based on by how much they outperform their benchmark as long as 
their fees decline symmetrically when they underperform that 
benchmark.202  The benchmark, however, is generally assessed on an 
annual basis.203 
Other financial professionals, including banking and finance 
executives, are also generally compensated on the basis of short-term 
performance.204  The problem with having financial professionals paid 
on the basis of a shorter time horizon is that they are incentivized to take 
 
 199. See, e.g., James R. Repetti, Corporate Governance and Stockholder 
Abdication: Missing Factors in Tax Policy Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 971, 997 
(1992) (“[B]ecause compensation schemes for institutional investors are frequently tied 
to annual investment return, rather than long-term investment performance, it is 
possible that investment managers trade in an attempt to maximize the annual return by 
capturing appreciation in their portfolio selections.”). 
 200. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8393, 69 Fed. Reg. 
11244 (Mar. 9, 2004). 
 201. John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as 
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1363 (1991). 
 202. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 205(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2) (1988).  
See also INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE FEES AND EXPENSE RATIOS, 
12 FUNDAMENTALS 1, 2 (Aug. 2003) (“With performance fee arrangements, the advisory 
fee rate is increased whenever the fund’s return exceeds a stated benchmark over a 
specified period.  The fee rate is symmetrically reduced when the fund’s performance 
falls short of the benchmark.”); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach 
Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. 
U. L. REV. 225, 319 (2007) (defining a “fulcrum fee” as a fee in which the manager of a 
mutual fund adjusts “ the base advisory fee depending on how the fund performs 
relative to a stipulated market index).  “The key to the fulcrum fee is that the percentage 
charged cannot merely increase when performance exceeds expectations--it must also 
decrease proportionately when performance lags.”  Id. 
 203. See supra note 199. 
 204. JIAN CAI ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, COMPENSATION AND 
RISK INCENTIVES IN BANKING AND FINANCE 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-13.pdf (“Bonuses are 
often tied to short-term financial performance, typically of the past one to three years. 
Thus, this compensation structure tends to reward short-term profits and may have 
encouraged ‘short-termism’ at financial institutions.”) 
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on tail risk,205 that is, to invest in assets that will bear short-term returns 
even if they are likely to be volatile and underperform in the long-run.206  
The financial advisers could have long cashed out their bonuses and 
retired by the time the tail risk catches up with their investors.207  For the 
investors, the tail risk can completely destroy not only all of their short-
term gain, but even the wealth they initially invested into the account. 
One way to combat this problem has been proposed vis-à-vis 
traders at investment banks (though it need not be limited to this group 
of financial professionals) by Professor Raghuram Rajan (“Professor 
Rajan”)208 in his book Fault Lines.209  Professor Rajan has proposed that 
traders not be given their bonuses in one lump sum at the end of the 
year, but rather be paid only a fraction of the bonus they earned based on 
that year’s performance.210  Professor Rajan indicates that it would be 
better for investors if the bonus was paid out in increments over time 
 
 205. A tail risk is a risk with a very small probability of manifesting.  It is named a 
“tail risk” because its probability is at the tail of a statistical distribution.  RAJAN, supra 
note 17, at 136-37. 
 206. Using the example of selling earthquake insurance, Professor Rajan illustrates 
how a fund manager’s adoption of tail risk is rewarded.  The manager sells earthquake 
insurance to buyers seeking to protect themselves from a catastrophic event.  In the 
short-term, the manager can demonstrate large profits from the incoming insurance 
premiums but no losses because an earthquake is a rare occurrence and is thus a long-
term risk.  The short-term profits are rewarded by superiors within the manager’s fund 
or customers seeking to invest with the manager to realize similar profits.  Thus, the 
manager’s behavior of adopting long-term risk for short-term profit is rewarded.  Profits 
eventually diminish or disappear altogether when an earthquake does occur and the 
manager must pay insurance claims.  If the manager did not save the short-term profits 
to protect against the long-term risk, the manager will default on the insurance claims.  
The manager’s incentive structure rewards short-term success at the expense of 
planning for long-term losses.  Id. at 138-39. 
 207. See id. at 139 (explaining that the rewards reaped during periods of short-term 
profit are likely to be enough to allow a manager taking on tail risk to live comfortably 
in retirement). 
 208. Raghuram Rajan is the Eric J. Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of 
Finance at the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, a current economic 
advisor to the Prime Minister of India, and was Chief Economist at the International 
Monetary Fund (2003-2007).  See The University of Chicago Booth School of 
Business, “Faculty Profile: Raghuram Rajan,” http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/ 
bio.aspx?person_id=12825569280 (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 209. Rajan, supra note 17, passim. 
 210. See id. at 164. 
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based on the performance of the trader’s positions over time.211  
Consequently, if all of the gains in the first year were lost by the end of 
the second year, the rest of the bonus would never be paid.212  Of course, 
determining the appropriate timeline for such bonus structures would be 
a challenge. 
Regulators may hesitate, as they should, to set such bonus 
structures.213  Such a task should be performed by the market.  What 
regulators could do, however, is incentivize the private sector to adopt 
structures that better incentivize long-term performance.  One way to 
accomplish this goal is to require blatant disclosure of the incentives of 
the financial professional, whether she is a mutual fund manager or other 
adviser, to achieve high performance beyond the current year.  In this 
way, firms may begin to compete more openly based on the incentive 
structures they can create and will experiment with different structures 
in an effort to compete for investors.  This approach would be consistent 
with the enhancement of social welfare through addressing a market 
failure as it seeks to remedy the information problem of investors not 
necessarily being aware of the incentives their financial advisers face. 
An opportunities-based policy would go further, perhaps by 
mandating that financial institutions establish long-term incentives, such 
as the proposal offered by Professor Rajan.  An opportunities-based 
approach need not prescribe the particular incentives; it need only 
mandate that incentives for long-term gains exist. 
 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. 
 213. See Jeremiah Thomas, TARP’s Hard Line on Executive Compensation: 
Misaligned Incentives and Constitutional Hurdles, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (2009) 
(arguing against the provisions restricting executive compensation in Congress’s 
implementation of the Troubled Assets Relief Fund and subsequent legislation).  One 
negative effect of statutory restrictions on bonus structures is that companies could shift 
towards higher salaries in place of performance based structures that can be altered to 
meet the financial realities of the current market.  Higher salaries would result in higher 
fixed costs, and would diminish external incentives to encourage performance.  Id. at 
1349-50.  See also David I. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus 
of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 435 (2010).  Previous attempts to regulate executive 
pay have included the use of tax incentives and mandatory pay disclosure.  These 
initiatives have achieved mixed success, and often have resulted in unintended 
consequences, such as shifting the cost of non-compliance with tax incentives to 
shareholders, and in the case of pay disclosure, incentivizing higher bonuses to avoid 
giving the appearance that executives were below average, which could undermine 
investor confidence.  Id. at 451-54. 
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In addition to the potential misalignment of time horizons between 
investors and their financial advisers, a conflict of interest could arise 
between the liquidation incentives of an investor and the financial 
advisers upon which she relies.  For instance, suppose that a mutual fund 
manager is compensated, at least in part, based on the total value of 
assets under her management at a particular point in time.214  Suppose 
also that the fund specializes in seeking out stocks that are undervalued 
based on certain fundamentals, holding them until they rise to provide a 
certain percentage return, and then liquidating these positions into a safe 
alternative, such as government bonds, to preserve the value gained 
while seeking more undervalued equity in which to invest.  Now 
suppose that the management fee is determined based on the total value 
of assets under management at the end of the year.215  A manager may 
thus be tempted to hold on to certain positions that she believes are 
overvalued in order to benefit from the fee gains at the end of the year.  
This decision could turn out to expose her investors to additional risk 
and volatility and not gain as much return as they otherwise would have, 
as these positions begin to lose value and the manager continues to hold 
on to them.  Of course, if the manager happens to be very lucky and the 
positions do not lose value before she is compensated, this could be a 
win-win situation for both her investors and her.  Such a scenario, 
however, is far from guaranteed. 
One way to overcome such perverse incentives is to base 
management compensation not on the value of assets at any point in 
time, but rather on their average value over a longer time horizon.216  In 
 
 214. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE FEES AND EXPENSE RATIOS, 
12 FUNDAMENTALS 1, 2 (Aug. 2003) (“Advisory fees are usually computed as a 
percentage of fund assets; many funds employ a declining rate structure under which 
the percentage fee rate decreases at designated breakpoints as assets increase.”).  
Mutual funds generally charge two types of fees: sales loads, a type of brokerage fee to 
compensate advisers for particular transactions which are paid either at the time of 
purchase or when the shares are redeemed, and fees for ongoing expenses, which are 
paid from fund assets and tend to decrease as the fund achieves economies of scale.  
Illig, supra note 202, at 320.  “Total mutual fund fees – ongoing expenses plus an 
annualized portion of any sales loads – decreased from an average of 2.32% of fund 
assets in 1980 to 1.07% of fund assets in 2006.”  Id. 
 215. See Dana Anspach, 6 Ways Financial Advisors Charge Fees, ABOUT.COM, 
http://moneyover55.about.com (“A typical asset management fee can range from 2.0% 
per year on the high side to .50% per year on the low side. Typically the more assets 
you have, the lower the fee.”). 
 216. See Black, supra note 197, at 877 (acknowledging that the incentives of private 
2011] ANOTHER ROLE FOR SECURITIES REGULATION: 835 
EXPANDING INVESTOR OPPORTUNITY 
 
this way, compensation would incentivize long-term stable wealth 
creation over short-term gains, which could deprive investors of more 
sustainable gains to their portfolios.  Consistent with an opportunities-
based approach, the SEC has recently proposed rules regulating 
incentive-based compensation arrangements at financial institutions.217  
In particular, the proposed regulations, if adopted, would: (1) require 
disclosure to federal regulators of the firm’s incentive-based 
compensation arrangements; (2) prohibit incentive-based compensation 
arrangements that encourage inappropriate risks; and (3) require 
financial institutions with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets 
to defer at least 50-percent of any incentive-based compensation for 
executive officers for three years.218  Furthermore, under the proposed 
rule, deferred compensation would be awarded on a pro rata basis and 
would be adjusted for losses incurred by the covered institution after the 
compensation’s initial reward.219  While this proposed regulation is 
controversial because of its proscriptive nature,220 it provides investors 
with the benefit of prioritizing longer-term goals by aligning the 
incentives of financial professionals with these goals. 
Regulators could further encourage a larger number of institutions 
to consider unique fee structures in multiple ways.  First, as mentioned 
before, they could mandate public disclosure of whether such incentives 
do or do not exist.  Second, they could require that incentives for long-
term performance exist, indicating that a host of options is possible, and 
not specifying which measure must be taken.  Third, federal regulators 
could indicate that during times of crisis, support for banks that do not 
have such incentives would be limited.  Such a threat would have to be 
credible, however, which is difficult given the magnitude of recent bank 
bailouts.221  In order to promote wealth creation and account for the 
 
money managers may need to be redirected toward more long-term goals). 
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cognitive limitations of most investors to process the overwhelming 
amounts of information with which they are already inundated, some 
type of direct mandate for incentives for long-term wealth creation are in 
order. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article advocates for the inclusion in the goals of securities 
regulation a value that has not heretofore been asserted.  Along with 
well functioning capital markets,222 efficient capital allocation,223 
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combating market failures,224 and other goals that have been advocated 
by legal scholars and policy makers, securities regulation should also 
seek to expand opportunities for wealth accumulation, particularly for 
the majority of our society, which has a small proportion of our nation’s 
wealth.225  In considering how to promote this goal, I take an 
interdisciplinary approach to illustrate the ways in which current policies 
do not adequately promote opportunities for wealth accumulation. 
First, I note that a regulatory approach that creates blatant divisions 
between groups creates cycles of entitlements and perceptions of 
unfairness that could delegitimize democratic government.226  At the 
same time, I advocate for a better understanding of how perceived 
differences in access empirically impact different groups of investors.  
Second, I look to the research in psychology and behavioral economics 
to evaluate how investors respond to the SEC’s current dominant 
approach toward regulation of mandating disclosures.227  This analysis 
shows that the current approach is inadequate in reducing inequities and 
may, in fact, be exacerbating inequities between those who are 
sophisticated and can afford assistance to absorb massive amounts of 
information and those who cannot.  Third, I also look to the behavioral 
economics literature to evaluate where regulation can help investors 
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mitigate their own behavioral biases, which inhibit them from acting in 
ways that are ultimately in their best interest.228  Regulatory policy can 
give “nudges” without taking choice away from investors to help them 
maintain and grow their wealth more effectively.229 
Finally, I apply the research of financial economists to examine the 
implications of how financial professionals are compensated given that 
the principal agent problem impacts the majority of investors because 
they delegate their investing decisions.230  This research demonstrates 
that the incentives of investment professionals do not always align with 
the long-term goals of investors, making it more difficult for investors to 
retain and grow their wealth.231  I provide suggestions for how regulators 
might induce the private sector to restructure the incentives of money 
managers, traders, and other investment professionals.232 
An opportunities-based approach, which would promote wealth 
accumulation for a greater proportion of society, is likely to result in a 
more long-term approach to investing.  Such an approach could have 
systemic benefits, making investors less prone to bubbles and bursts.233  
The positive externalities of taking an opportunities-based approach are 
not to be underestimated.  Promoting more stable, long-term investing 
could lead to wealth creation that incentivizes more saving and 
investment, creating a positive feedback loop of wealth creation for 
many who, to date, have been unable to benefit from the tremendous 
opportunities for investment and wealth creation in our society. 
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